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Executive Summary 
 
 
Background to the report 
 
The UK’s departure from the EU will usher in important changes to 
immigration policy. The UK Government’s proposals on immigration are set 
out in the December 2018 White Paper on The UK’s Future Skills-Based 
Immigration System, which draws on prior recommendations from the 
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). These proposals suggest that from 
January 2021, EU nationals will be subject to UK immigration rules. The 
proposals also suggest changes to the current points based system, notably:  
 
• an expansion of the Tier 2 route for skilled workers, through abolishing 
the annual cap and lowering the skills threshold, as well as simplifying 
procedures for employers; and 
• piloting a seasonal agricultural workers’ programme, and introducing a 
transitional temporary workers route covering all skills levels. 
 
The proposals are intended to reduce overall net migration to the UK, while 
expanding opportunities for skilled migrants. 
 
This report examines how these changes are likely to affect migration to 
Scotland; and how changes in immigration may in turn affect areas of 
devolved responsibility in Scotland, including economic growth, public 
services, and the sustainability of communities. The report focuses on four 
broad dimensions of change: the labour market, fiscal impacts, demographic 
trends, and social effects on local communities. 
 
Migration to Scotland 
 
Migration from EU countries has accounted for a significant portion of 
overseas immigration over the past decade. Most EU nationals come to 
Scotland to work and have higher employment rates than UK nationals, and 
are on average younger than the UK population.  EU nationals work in a 
range of sectors, and comprise a substantial share of Scotland’s employment 
in sectors such as accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and 
administrative and support services. 
 
EU migration since the 2000s has been widely distributed across all areas of 
Scotland. While cities enjoy a higher share of immigration, rural and remote 
areas have also seen a substantial rise in immigration. This has been enabled 
by the free movement framework, which allows flexible patterns of movement 
and employment for EU nationals. The absence of a skills threshold has also 
meant that EU migrants have filled lower-skilled jobs in areas such as 
agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, health and social care, across Scotland.  
 
The UK’s withdrawal from free movement would restrict EU immigration to the 
points based system, with most labour migration channelled through Tier 2.  
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Drawing on a range of data and taking into account the White Paper analysis, 
we develop two scenarios for future migration flows. 
 
 Scenario 1 
 80% reduction in EU net migration 
 
 Scenario 2 
 50% reduction in EU net migration 
 
The first scenario builds on the analysis of the White Paper, while the second 
takes into account inflows of dependents, family migration, and also factors in 
an expected increase in non-EU nationals because of changes to Tier 2.  
 
Based on these scenarios, we project that the proposed changes could lead 
to a reduction in annual overseas net migration to Scotland of between one 
third and one half after 2020. This would imply a reduction in annual net 
migration from around +13,000 (the average net migration over the past five 
years) to a range between +6,600 and +9,000. However, as with all migration 
projections, we note that these are approximations. 
 
Key to understanding the effects of this change is how reduced migration 
flows are distributed – both across sectors, and across different areas of 
Scotland. Understanding these differentiated effects is the focus of the next 
sections of the report. 
 
Labour market effects 
 
In order to understand the effects of Tier 2 provisions on EU migration, we 
analyse the distribution of incomes across Scotland, including for different 
employment groups, by age and gender, and for local areas. 
 
Overall, 63% of workers in Scotland earn less than the proposed £30,000 
salary threshold for Tier 2. This would be 58% if the salary threshold were 
reduced to £27,500, and 53% in the case of a £25,000 threshold. In 
occupations such as textiles, social care, leisure and travel, sales, and 
elementary occupations, almost no jobs would qualify for a £30,000 threshold.  
 
One example of a severely affected sector is social care, where less than 
10% of those in caring personal service occupations in Scotland earn above 
£25,000, and none earn £30,000. The budgetary pressures faced by local 
authorities, the main purchaser of social care services, mean that there is little 
prospect of raising salaries in social care to a level that would attract greater 
numbers of UK workers. Therefore, the proposed changes will exacerbate 
existing labour shortages in many areas. The brunt of these shortages is likely 
to be borne by friends and family who will have to assume responsibility for 
care, and especially female family members. 
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Looking at the effects by age and gender, we found that only 25% of those 
aged 22-29 meet the £30,000 threshold, rising to between 43% and 45% for 
those in their 30s and 40s. A far lower proportion of female employees meet 
the £30,000 threshold. Indeed, in many of the occupations dominated by 
female employees, salaries do not even meet a lower £25,000 threshold, 
implying that the proposed Tier 2 arrangements could create a gender 
disparity in the supply of future migrants. 
 
If we look at the regional distribution of salaries across Scotland, we see a 
wide variation in the proportion of jobs that meet the £30,000 threshold, 
ranging from 49.5% in East Renfrewshire to just 16% in Na h-Eileanan Siar. 
This implies that very few migrants would be able to move to those areas to 
work under Tier 2. This would limit labour migration in areas of Scotland that 
already experience low levels of productivity and face challenges of 
depopulation. Relaxing the income threshold would substantially increase the 
range of jobs available to migrants.   
 
Our analysis also shows that EU employees work longer hours than their 
UK-born equivalents – on average 5% more. This implies that maintaining 
current levels of output would require more than a one-to-one replacement of 
EU workers with UK-born employees. 
 
Fiscal effects 
 
The fiscal effects of EU migrants on the Scottish economy are similar to the 
effects on the UK economy as a whole. The UK evidence suggests that EU 
migrants typically contribute more through tax revenues than they consume 
by way of public services. This conclusion largely holds for EU migrants to 
Scotland, though their average earnings are slightly lower than the average 
for EU workers in the UK as a whole, and therefore they contribute slightly 
less to tax revenues. 
   
As in the rest of the UK, EU migrants to Scotland are typically young and 
economically active, and people of their age group tend to consume a 
relatively small amount of public services because they are not usually 
receiving welfare benefits, nor are they heavy users of health and social care 
services. However, if they have children, they are likely to consume publicly 
provided education services. If they remain in Scotland, EU migrants may 
eventually consume health and social care services. But the lifetime balance 
of their contribution to tax revenues and use of public spending will tend to be 
favourable, other things being equal, because the costs of their early 
upbringing and education have been met by another state. 
  
EU migration also affects the allocation of fiscal risk between the Scottish and 
UK Governments. Following the Scotland Act 2016, the Scottish Government 
is responsible for income tax and a share of VAT revenues raised within 
Scotland as well as a number of welfare benefits. It also pays for, or 
contributes towards, services such as health, education and local 
government. Changes in EU migration will have differential effects on tax 
revenue collected, and on public spending, by the respective governments. 
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While Scotland is responsible for providing migrants with many public 
services, it may only appropriate a portion of the tax revenue paid by 
migrants. It is therefore important to understand the distribution of revenue 
and expenditure associated with migration across different levels of 
government. This implies the need for a more nuanced analysis of the spatial 
distribution of the fiscal benefits of immigration.  
  
Population effects 
 
Immigration to Scotland has been the major driver of population change since 
the early 2000s. After a prolonged period of population decline, Scotland’s 
population grew from 5.07 million to 5.42 million between 2000-2017. This 
was largely driven by migration rather than natural change, which has been 
negative since 2015. If migration stays at its current level, Scotland’s 
population is projected to increase by 8% over the next 25 years. With 
reduced migration from the EU, it would increase by between 5%-6%. 
Migration can also help reduce the speed of population ageing, though its 
impact is relatively small. The proportion of people aged 65 and older in 
Scotland is expected to rise from 29 per 100 over the next 25 years to 
between 41 and 46 per hundred, across all migration scenarios. Scotland is 
projected to experience more pronounced population ageing than other parts 
of the UK. 
 
While immigration will not significantly reduce the speed of population ageing 
in Scotland, it will have a considerable effect on the absolute size and age 
composition of the working age population. At current immigration rates, the 
working age population is expected to remain stable over the next 25 years, 
whereas with reduced migration from the EU, it is projected to decline by 
between 3% and 5%. Reduced EU migration would lead to a gradually 
declining and rapidly ageing working age population. This is in contrast to the 
UK as a whole, where the working age population would still grow with 
reduced international migration. While the provision of health care for a rapidly 
growing elderly population will be a UK-wide challenge in coming decades, 
population ageing in tandem with a declining working age population will 
exacerbate the challenge of managing the consequences of an ageing society 
in Scotland. 
 
Importantly, the impact of demographic processes is not spread evenly across 
different areas of Scotland. Between 2007-2017, urban and mixed urban/rural 
areas benefited from positive natural change (that is, more births than deaths) 
and substantial immigration, mostly from the rest of the UK but also from 
overseas. Areas that are mainly rural saw only small natural increase, but this 
was more than compensated by in-migration. Remote rural and island areas, 
by contrast, experienced negative natural change, which was not balanced by 
in-migration. The demographic challenges for these areas will therefore be 
exacerbated by the proposed changes to EU migration. 
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Overseas migration is especially conducive to future demographic stability 
because of its relatively young age structure. However, in rural and remote 
areas a much smaller share of in-migrants come from overseas than is the 
case in urban areas. In 2017 just 8% of in-migrants to rural areas were from 
outside the UK, compared to 28% for cities. Moreover, rural areas are far less 
likely to have jobs that meet the Tier 2 salary threshold recommended by the 
MAC. As a consequence, the changes proposed in the White Paper would 
largely eliminate opportunities for encouraging the longer-term stay and 
settlement of non-UK nationals in rural Scotland.  
 
It is important to recognise that, for remoter rural areas and islands, attracting 
working-age migrants (including from EU countries) is the only realistic option 
to avert a downward demographic spiral driven by the age structure legacy of 
selective out-migration during the last decades of the twentieth century. Under 
the proposed changes to migration policy these areas of Scotland seem to be 
facing a ‘demographic double whammy’, which is likely to have far-reaching 
implications for economic activity, the provision of services, and levels of 
general well-being. 
 
Local communities 
 
Free movement has enabled EU migrants to live and work across Scotland 
including in rural and remote areas, including through routes that begin 
elsewhere in the UK. The flexibility of free movement has facilitated the 
emergence of migrant networks, as family and friends move to join previous 
migrants, and such networks facilitate integration and settlement. At the same 
time, access to social security and public services has enabled EU migrants 
to sustain often low-paid and precarious jobs.   
 
Local authorities in Scotland, as well as employers and third sector 
organisations, have actively supported the recruitment and settlement of 
EU migrants. Many areas have invested in infrastructure to support language 
learning and have developed tailored support services.   Local authorities 
have also played an active role in recruiting and retaining EU staff working in 
public services such as teaching and social care. In some areas facing 
population decline, EU nationals have made an important contribution to 
sustaining such services, in turn helping to retain existing populations in these 
areas, both UK and foreign-born. 
 
The experiences of EU nationals have not been universally positive, and in 
many cases those in lower-paid and lower-skilled jobs may experience more 
limited prospects for social mobility. EU migrants have also faced similar 
challenges to previous waves of immigration, in many cases suffering from 
social isolation, long working hours, and concentration in more deprived 
neighbourhoods. Many who moved to rural areas have cited a more 
welcoming attitude, and have benefited from the efforts of local authorities 
and other groups to provide support and encourage their longer-term 
integration. 
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The proposals to end free movement and restrict immigration to Tier 2 and 
temporary routes would seriously disrupt current patterns of mobility and 
settlement across Scotland. As we saw, there are very few jobs available in 
rural and remote areas that would meet the £30,000 salary threshold, and 
many jobs would not meet a lower £25,000 threshold. The proposed seasonal 
agricultural workers programme and transitional temporary scheme would 
involve short-term stays of single migrants, without access to public funds and 
with no pathway to settlement and integration. This would prohibit the 
retention of staff in many local areas, with serious consequences for the 
sustainability of local services.  
 
The proposals also imply a diversification of migrants in terms of countries of 
origin. This is not a problem in itself, and could make a positive contribution to 
local communities. However, the presence of migrants from a wider range of 
countries, alongside changes to existing patterns of migration with regard to 
length of stays, gender, age and family profiles, would require existing 
services to adapt in order to support newer groups and their social integration. 
Smaller communities will also lack existing migrant networks in local areas, 
implying less informal support for integration. The potential consequences for 
local support services require further analysis.  
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Key points 
 
• The changes set out in the White Paper are projected to reduce net 
migration to Scotland by between 30% and 50% over the coming two 
decades.  
• Under this reduced migration scenario, Scotland would continue to grow 
its population, but at a lower rate compared to current levels of 
migration. Lower levels of immigration from the EU countries would not 
significantly reduce the speed of population ageing in Scotland, but they 
would lead to a gradual decline and ageing of the working age 
population. 
• An expanded and simplified Tier 2 would widen the route for skilled 
non-EU workers, and could sustain at least a portion of EU immigration 
flows from those meeting the skills and salary criteria.  
• However, the overall reduction in EU immigration would be especially 
challenging for those sectors most reliant on lower-paid, 
non-UK workers, including occupations such as textiles, social care, 
leisure and travel, sales and elementary occupations. Many of these 
sectors would be unable to adjust by increased investment in skills  or 
capital and as a result may need to change their business model. 
• Restricted routes for EU immigration would also be particularly disruptive 
for rural and remote areas of Scotland, where the old age structure 
means that in-migration is the only means of countering depopulation. 
The prevalence of lower-paid jobs in these areas implies it would not be 
feasible to recruit workers under Tier 2.  
• The seasonal and temporary programmes proposed in the White Paper 
would prohibit the longer-term settlement of immigrants working in key 
sectors, which would again be most acutely felt in rural and remote 
communities where such jobs are particularly important.  
• The proposals will significantly change the patterns of migration 
Scotland has seen over the last 10-15 years. A proliferation of smaller 
groups of migrants from a wider range of countries, a predominance of 
shorter stays, changes to gender, age and family profiles, will require 
planning and investment for successful social integration.   
• The proposals are likely to have a pronounced gender effect, with 
proportionally fewer women able to meet the salary threshold, especially 
in rural areas and areas of disadvantage.  
• Non-migrant women would also be especially affected by labour 
shortages in social care, as female family members would be most likely 
to bear the burden of gaps in care provision. 
  
1
Introduction
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Purpose and scope of the report 
 
In October 2018 the Scottish Government established an Expert Advisory 
Group on Migration and Population, to provide analysis and advice on aspects 
of immigration to Scotland. The first commission to the Expert Advisory Group 
was issued on 25 October, with a remit to:  
 
• review the policy recommendations made by the Migration Advisory 
Committee (MAC) in their report on EEA Migration in the UK,1 in order to 
identify the potential effects of those recommendations on immigration to 
Scotland; and 
• consider and advise on how such changes to immigration might 
potentially affect areas of devolved competence in Scotland.  
 
Subsequent to this, in December 2018 the UK Government published a White 
Paper, The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System, which further 
elaborates proposals for UK labour migration policy after the UK leaves the 
European Union (EU). This report will therefore consider both the MAC 
recommendations and the proposals set out in the White Paper, exploring 
their potential consequences for immigration to Scotland and for areas of 
devolved competence. 
 
Immigration policy is a reserved competence, with legislation on the entry, 
residence and employment rights of non-UK nationals adopted at UK level. 
For this reason, the report will not produce recommendations on immigration 
policy. However, immigration to Scotland does have a number of important 
effects on areas of devolved responsibility. These include a range of public 
services that may be affected by immigration such as education and training, 
health and social services, housing, and many aspects of welfare, as well as 
tax-raising and social security powers established in the 2016 Scotland Act. 
The Scottish Government is also committed to promoting sustainable growth 
in the Scottish economy, as set out in Scotland’s economic strategy; and the 
sustainability and well-being of communities. It is therefore important to 
analyse how the proposed changes to immigration will affect the ability of the 
Scottish Government to deliver public services and achieve these broader 
economic and social goals.  
 
The Expert Advisory Group decided that the best way to analyse the effects of 
immigration policy on these areas was to focus on four broad dimensions of 
change, which would in turn have knock-on effects for these areas of 
devolved powers. These are: 
 
• Labour market. The supply of labour across different sectors of the 
economy and in different areas of Scotland has important effects on 
wages and employment, productivity and growth, as well as the 
availability of goods and services.  
UK Immigration Policy After Leaving The EU: Impacts on Scotland’s Economy, Population and Society 
 11 
• Population. Immigration inflows and outflows have a direct effect on 
population growth, and on the age composition of the population. These 
dynamics affect all areas of devolved competence, including the 
provision of and demand for public services, economic growth, and the 
sustainability of communities. 
• Fiscal impacts. The scale and composition of immigration has an impact 
on the public finances through the collection of taxes and national 
insurance, and the provision of public services to immigrants.  
• Local communities. Immigration flows, and how they are distributed 
across different areas, can have significant effects on local communities 
in terms of their well-being and sustainability, for example through 
affecting the viability of local industries and public services. 
 
Our analysis takes on board many elements of the MAC’s report on EEA 
Migration in the UK. This report offered rigorous analysis of the labour market, 
fiscal and social impacts of immigration in the UK, confirming and further 
building on previous findings about the broadly positive economic effects of 
immigration. However, as a UK-wide report, the MAC did not foreground the 
particular economic, demographic and social challenges faced by Scotland 
and other parts of the UK. Moreover, given the focus on UK-wide data it did 
not analyse in detail the impacts of the proposed changes for particular 
sectors, or for different types of communities, which range from urban to rural 
and remote. This report therefore helps fill this gap, identifying some of the 
variegated impacts of the proposed changes for particular sectors and local 
areas.  
 
The current report responds to the Scottish Government’s need for a swift 
assessment of the MAC and UK Government proposals. It was prepared by a 
group of five experts based in universities and research centres in Scotland. 
This necessarily limited the scope of the analysis, and in the report we 
suggest a number of areas that would benefit from more in-depth analysis. 
 
 
1.2 The recommendations 
 
The White Paper proposes a single UK immigration system for EU and non-
EU nationals which prioritises higher-skilled immigration.
 
• Free movement of workers will end once the UK leaves the EU, and EU 
nationals will be subject to UK immigration rules. 
 
• Tier 2 of the points based system (skilled migrants) will be expanded 
through: 
 - removing the cap on numbers admitted through Tier 2; - removing the resident labour market test (though retaining the 
Immigration Skills Charge paid by employers); - simplifying sponsorship for employers; - allowing nationals of ‘lowest risk countries’ to apply for a work visa 
while in the UK; 
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- reducing the skills threshold for Tier 2 from RQF6+ to RQF3+ 
(A-levels, Highers or equivalent); - retaining a salary threshold (the MAC recommended a level of 
£30,000, but the White Paper proposes consultation to determine the 
precise level); and - retaining a separate Shortage Occupation List (SOL) for Scotland, 
and considering similar lists for Northern Ireland and Wales, 
potentially allowing a lower salary threshold for certain occupations 
facing acute shortages with a skills level of RQF3 or above. 
 
• There will be no route specifically for low-skilled workers, but there is a 
recognition that some employers will find it difficult to adapt immediately 
to this change. As a transitional measure, the government will introduce 
a route for temporary workers, which will feature: 
 - a maximum stay of 12 months in the UK, followed by a 12-month 
‘cooling off’ period; - workers may  move between employers, with no employer 
sponsorship required; - no access to public funds or rights to extend stay, switch to other 
routes, or bring dependents; - the route is only open to specified countries such as ‘low risk’ 
countries; - visa fees for workers will be increased incrementally each year to 
reduce reliance on migrant labour; and - the possibility of a cap on the route, or early closure, depending on 
the level of flows and the economic situation, ahead of review in 2025. 
 
• There will be a specific sectoral programme for seasonal agricultural 
workers open to non-EU nationals, which will be piloted from March 
2019. The government accepts the MAC’s recommendation that 
employers should be required to pay an ‘upwardly revised national 
minimum wage’. 
 
• The government accepts the MAC’s recommendations for moderate 
changes to post-study work, including: 
 - extending post-study leave for graduates to six months, during which 
they can find skilled work (under Tier 2), and may work temporarily; - extending post-study leave for PhD graduates to 12 months; and - allowing students to switch into Tier 2 three months before the end of 
their course and from outside the UK up to two years after graduation. 
 
The White Paper suggests that the changes to Tier 2 in particular represent ‘a 
very significant change… ensuring that there are no limits on the volumes of 
skilled migrants.’  This is intended to align with the UK’s industrial strategy, 
which aims for ‘a highly skilled, innovative and highly productive workforce.’ 
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1.3 Methods 
 
In order to analyse the potential impact of the changes, the report maps 
different scenarios of future migration flows to Scotland, and considers the 
effects of such scenarios on the labour market, tax revenues and public 
expenditure, population trends, and on local communities in different areas of 
Scotland. The first scenario is based on the projection set out in the White 
Paper, which estimates an 80% reduction in EU immigration for the purpose 
of work. Based on this figure, we set out a scenario of an 80% reduction in net 
migration from and to EU countries after 2020. The second scenario is based 
on our own calculations of the potential impacts of the proposals, and 
assumes a 50% reduction in net migration of EU nationals after 2020. Both of 
these projections start from a baseline of overseas in-flows and out-flows 
averaged over the past five years.  
 
It is important to note that this is different from the principal projection by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the National Records of Scotland 
(NRS), which is based on averaged flows over the past 25 years. This is 
because in our projections, we are interested in the effect of reduced 
migration from the EU on the size and structure of Scotland’s population. In 
order to measure the effect of reduced EU immigration, our principal variant 
assumes that current migration streams (the average in- and out-migration 
over the last five years) will continue in the future.  
 
These projections are inevitably very approximate, given uncertainty over the 
future drivers of migration. Analysis of previous migration flows is also 
hampered by the unavailability of robust data. Flows data are based on the 
Long-Term International Migration figures, drawn from the International 
Passenger Survey (IPS). As documented elsewhere, IPS data is unreliable, 
given the small sample size and reliance on respondents’ stated reasons for 
migration and their future plans. This inhibits in-depth analysis of migration 
trends and patterns.  
 
Flows data are complemented with data on the population of immigrants in 
Scotland and the UK, drawn from a range of survey and administrative data 
from both ONS and NRS, including the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the 
Annual Population Survey (APS), and Annual Population Estimates, the 2011 
Census, and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. To complement these 
Scotland or UK-level data, we also draw on administrative data such as 
National Insurance (NINO) registrations. 
 
These data allow some analysis of the local impacts of immigration, and thus 
allow us to explore the potential implications of the changes. However, even 
data on local areas cannot capture the range of impacts on local communities. 
We therefore complement the statistical data with qualitative data on 
particular sectors, and on specific communities in Scotland.2 This allows us to 
illustrate the potential effects of the changes on local communities, including 
in remote areas of Scotland. It also allows us to capture the effects of different 
patterns of movement, including a comparison of the effects of longer-term 
settlement and integration, versus shorter-term mobility. 
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The next chapter summarises recent trends in overseas migration to 
Scotland, and suggests how policy changes after leaving the EU might affect 
current patterns of migration and settlement. The subsequent chapters all 
deal with a distinct dimension of change, examining the labour market, fiscal, 
demographic and social effects of the projected changes. The effects outlined 
in these chapters are in many ways interdependent. Changes to the demand 
and supply of labour will clearly affect inflows, and the scale and composition 
of flows in turn affect the fiscal impact of migration, the size and age 
composition of the population, the spatial distribution of immigrants, and the 
characteristics and settlement decisions of immigrants. All of these features in 
turn have an impact on the well-being of local communities across Scotland. 
While it is therefore difficult to disentangle these interactions, we nonetheless 
decided to deal with these dimensions in separate chapters, reflecting the 
different methodologies used to analyse the effects.  
 
Finally, it is important to clarify terminology used in the paper. For simplicity, 
we use the terms ‘EU migration,’ ‘EU citizens’ and ‘EU nationals’ throughout 
this report, which also refers to EEA countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, and 
Norway) and Switzerland. This follows the terminology used in the White 
Paper. While we acknowledge that some data also includes non-EU EEA 
nationals, the numbers involved are very small.  
 
We also distinguish between different sub-groups of EU nationals, notably:  
 
• EU-8 nationals (citizens of eight of the countries that acceded to the EU 
in 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia); 
• EU-2 nationals (citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, which acceded in 
2007, and whose citizens were granted full access to the UK labour 
market in 2014); 
• EU-10 nationals (counting the EU-8 and EU-2 together); and  
• EU-15 nationals (the ‘old’ member states who were members prior to 
2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom).  
 
We use the term ‘non-EU’ to refer to countries outside of the EU, EEA and 
Switzerland. 
 
The data we draw on also classifies EU and overseas immigration in different 
ways. In some cases, data refer to residents’ country of birth (e.g. when using 
the term ‘foreign-born’, ‘EU-born’ or ‘UK-born’). In other cases the data refer 
to the current nationality of immigrants (‘EU nationals’, ‘UK nationals’, and so 
on), implying that foreign-born residents who have acquired UK citizenship 
are counted as ‘UK nationals’. Data on migration flows, by contrast, often 
refers to the country from which migrants arrived (for in-flows) or their country 
of destination (for out-flows), which may not necessarily be their country of 
origin or nationality.  
 
2
Migration to Scotland
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2. Migration to Scotland 
 
 
This chapter briefly summarises recent trends in migration to Scotland, and provides 
an overview of the characteristics of migrants, including main reasons for migration, 
occupations, age and sex, and geographical distribution across Scotland. It then 
considers how the proposed changes to free movement and UK immigration rules 
are likely to affect these trends, setting out different scenarios for migration flows to 
Scotland after 2020. 
 
 
2.1 Recent migration trends 
 
Migration flows 
 
Scotland experienced a period of negative net migration from the 1950s until the late 
1980s (more outflows than inflows into the country). However, from the early 2000s, 
the country –- saw positive net migration both from overseas and the rest of the UK 
(rUK) (Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Net migration to Scotland (International and rUK), 1951-2016 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Average net migration from mid-2001 to mid-2017 was around +21,000 individuals a 
year (Figure 2.2). The analysis shows that net migration to Scotland has been 
positive for both overseas migrants, and for those from rUK, although overseas 
migration has seen greater fluctuation (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.2: In- and out-migration from Scotland, 2001-2017 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Net migration rate in Scotland, 2001-20173 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Over the past decade, an estimated 45% of migrants to Scotland from overseas 
have come from EU countries. Comparing Scotland with the UK, we can see that, 
overall, the trends are similar, although the data suggest that the number of people 
arriving from EU countries relative to those leaving for the EU has been larger for 
Scotland than for the UK (Figure 2.4). However, we note the need for caution in 
analysing data by country of origin, given the small sample sizes for Scotland in the 
International Passenger Survey (IPS) and the LFS. 
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Recent estimates suggest that immigration from EU countries to Scotland and the 
UK is decreasing. IPS estimates for Scotland suggest a decrease in inflows and an 
increase in outflows in 2017, compared to the two previous years. Particularly 
striking is the decline in EU-8 immigration to Scotland, with estimated inflows at 
1,700, significantly lower than the average of 4,850 over the previous ten years, and 
at their lowest point since 2006 (with the exception of the year after the financial 
crisis, 2008). This may reflect economic conditions in the UK (for example the falling 
value of sterling), as well as uncertainties around leaving the EU and the anticipated 
end of free movement rights.4 It may also reflect a decline in the pool of potential 
emigrants from EU-8 countries, due to rising employment opportunities and income 
in countries of origin and the declining size of young adults’ cohorts.   
 
 
Figure 2.4: Share of EU migrants among international migrants in Scotland and the 
UK, 2001-2017 
 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Reasons for migration to Scotland 
 
Most EU nationals come to the UK to work. Estimates for 2013-2017 suggest that 
67% of immigrants from EU countries came to the UK either with a definite job or to 
look for work. A further 19% entered to study, and 9% to join family. Moreover, a 
proportion of those who entered for the purpose of study or to join family may also go 
on to become economically active. Conversely, the cohorts of younger EU nationals 
who have settled in the UK since the 1990s will eventually become pensioners.  
 
The proportion of non-EU entrants entering for work reasons was somewhat lower, 
estimated at 28% for the period 2013-2017. This reflects the more restricted 
possibilities for non-EU nationals to live and work in the UK. A larger proportion 
(48%) entered to study, and a further 19% to join family. Again, it should be noted 
that some family members may become economically active after they arrive, while 
some students may also switch to work routes.  
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Figure 2.5: Reason for immigration to the UK by citizenship, 2013-2017 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Migrants from EU countries tend to be younger than the average population. Figure 
2.6 shows that immigration from overseas to Scotland has been dominated by those 
aged 20-29, with the proportion rising after the EU-8 accession in 2004. The high 
proportion of 20-24 year olds is partly accounted for by student migration; while the 
overall preponderance of 20-29 year olds reflects the fact that many young people 
move at the beginning of their career to enhance their job prospects, and prior to 
starting a family.  
 
 
Figure 2.6: In-migration rate from overseas in Scotland, 2001-2016 
Source: NRS 
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2.2 Sectors of Employment and Occupations 
 
We now examine the distribution of migrant workers across the labour market using 
the APS and the LFS. Although these surveys provide the best available information 
on migrants, it is possible that they underestimate levels of migration. The reasons 
for this include non-sampling of communal establishments such as halls of 
residence, language difficulties and/or reticence in responses to interview questions, 
especially if work status has not been established. In particular, the LFS and the 
APS are unlikely to capture the role of seasonal agricultural workers accurately. 
Country of birth is classified either as the UK; the EU-15; the EU-10; or other non-UK 
countries.  
 
We start by examining how economic activity varies across these country-of-birth 
classifications. Figure 2.7 shows how they vary by economic activity in Scotland. 
Employment accounts for more than 50% of activity across all groups, but is 
particularly high for those from the EU-10 countries. A relatively large proportion of 
residents in Scotland born in the EU-15 are students. The distribution of economic 
activity among those born outside the EU more closely resembles that of the UK-
born than either the EU-15 or EU-10. The proportion of self-employed individuals 
from the EU-10 and EU-15 (not including the UK) exceeds that of the UK-born: 
around 7.5% of EU migrants to Scotland are self-employed. Setting tight criteria on 
access to the UK labour market for the self-employed is likely to limit growth in firm 
formation in Scotland, which already lags behind the rest of the UK. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Economic Activity by Country of Birth  
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
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Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of employment across Scottish industries by 
country of birth. It shows those sectors that are more dependent on migrant labour, 
and how this reliance on migrants is distributed between the EU-15, the EU-10 and 
other non-EU countries. Note that ‘UK’ includes those born in Scotland and the UK 
as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Employment Shares by Country of Birth and Broad Industry 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
 
 
Accommodation and food services, which mainly comprise hotels and restaurants, 
are most dependent on migrants, with almost 22% of the workforce born outside the 
UK. These services form the main component of the tourism sector, which 
contributes around £6 billion to Scottish GDP, or 5% of total value-added.5 This is 
also a growing sector, with the number of overseas visitors to Scotland increasing by 
17% between 2011 and 2016. 
 
Dependency on migrant workers is high in many other sectors, with the number born 
in the EU considerably exceeding those born outside the EU. Exceptions are sectors 
which require advanced qualifications, such as education, finance, health and IT, 
where there is a similar or slightly larger share of non-EU nationals. 
 
However, such broad industrial sectors do not capture the detailed picture of 
dependency on migrant labour. Figure 2.9 provides a breakdown of those industries 
in Scotland that have more than 10% of their employees born outside the UK. This 
more detailed disaggregation highlights the role played by EU-10 workers in 
manufacturing food, leather products and so on. It also highlights the dependency of 
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scientific research, computer programming, film and video production on migrants 
from the EU-15 countries. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Employment Shares by Country of Birth and Detailed Industry 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
 
 
A similar analysis of how migrants are distributed by occupation provides an 
indication of where gaps may appear in the Scottish labour market should the supply 
of migrants be significantly reduced. Figure 2.10 shows the migrant shares in those 
occupations where more than 20% of the workforce was born outside the UK. 
 
The majority of these occupations are not classified as high-skilled. Health 
professions, science and IT are the main exceptions. In these occupations it is 
non-EU and EU-15 countries that dominate the foreign-born employment share, 
whereas in the less skilled occupations, migrants from EU-10 countries play a much 
greater role. 
 
The MAC report on EEA Migration in the UK notes that one strategy to offset the 
effects of a reduction in immigration is to encourage the UK-born to remain longer in 
the workforce by deferring retirement.  However, the UK-born workforce is already 
relatively old due to Scotland’s demography.  Table 2.1 shows the mean age of 
workers by major occupation and country of birth. It clearly shows that almost without 
exception, the average age of the UK-born exceeds that of migrant workers. The gap 
between the age of the UK-born and that of EU-10 migrants, who are generally the 
most recent arrivals, is particularly striking. Policies to encourage the already older 
UK-born to work longer would have to be introduced as a matter of urgency, given 
their existing age profile.   
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Figure 2.10: Employment Shares by Country of Birth and Detailed Occupation 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
 
 
Table 2.1: Mean Age of Workers by Broad Occupation and Country of Birth 
 UK EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU 
Managers, directors and senior officials 48.8 46.4 35.9 47.7 
Professional occupations 45.1 42.3 37.9 44.2 
Associate professional and technical 
occupations 44.0 42.1 33.4 43.0 
Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 45.0 46.0 32.9 43.8 
Skilled trades occupations 44.7 42.7 35.2 44.0 
Caring, leisure and other service 
occupations 44.1 44.7 33.7 43.1 
Sales and customer service occupations 38.1 35.2 32.6 36.9 
Process, plant and machine operatives 47.4 42.4 35.4 46.6 
Elementary occupations 41.4 35.8 34.7 39.8 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
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Contributions to value added depend not only on the number of workers, but also on 
the number of hours that they work. Again, there are contrasts between migrants and 
the UK-born, with the average EU-15 and EU-10 employee working around 5% more 
hours than their UK-born equivalents. This pattern is reversed among the 
self-employed, but since these comprise only 11.5% of all workers, the extra hours 
worked by employees more than offsets the extra contribution for the UK-born self-
employed. Thus, if these working time patterns persist and immigration falls, 
maintaining current levels of output would require a more than one-for-one 
replacement of migrant workers by the UK-born. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Weekly Hours of Work by Country of Birth and Employment Status 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 2013-2017 
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2.3  Geographical Distribution 
 
Over the past five years, the rate of immigration flows to Scotland from overseas has 
been just under 6.5 per 1,000 head of population per year (see Table 2.2). However, 
the rate of migration varies across different areas of Scotland. While larger cities 
have seen an annual immigration rate of almost 16 per 1,000, other types of areas 
(including remote and rural areas, and urban with substantial rural) have 
experienced an immigration rate of around 3 per 1,000. This rate is at a lower level 
than the rate for 2004-08, which saw large numbers of EU-8 nationals move to 
Scotland following accession in 2004. Figure 2.12 shows this distribution by council 
area type in Scotland, mapping flows per 1,000 head of population between 2013 
and 2017. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Rates of International In-Migration per 1,000 
 2004-08 2013-17 
Larger Cities 17.78 15.94 
Urban with Substantial Rural 3.68 2.60 
Mainly Rural 5.05 3.05 
Islands and Remote Rural 3.97 2.85 
Scotland 7.86 6.42 
Source: NRS Local Area Migration 2017 6 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Overseas In-Migrants per 1,000 
 
Source: NRS Local Area Migration 2017 
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Figure 2.13: Overseas Migration per 1,000, 2013-17 
 
Source: NRS Local Area Migration 2017 
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We can observe a similar spatial distribution if we look at data on National Insurance 
registrations (NINOs), which show a concentration of international migrants in the 
cities. The NINO data also show how the EU-8 accession in 2004 led to a substantial 
increase in labour migration to all areas of Scotland, including mainly rural and 
islands and remote rural areas. The NINO figures may be under-representing 
migration to remoter areas, as non-UK nationals are more likely to move to such 
locations as secondary destinations, after an initial stay in urban or less remote rural 
areas.  
 
This is borne out by studies showing how EU migrants, and especially nationals of 
EU-8 countries, have been distributed across all types of areas of Scotland. This is in 
contrast to previous migratory movements to Scotland, as well as immigration of 
non-EU nationals, which have tended to be more strongly concentrated in larger 
cities. The wider spatial distribution of EU migrants has been linked to the relative 
lack of restrictions for both migrants and employers within the free movement 
framework. 
 
 
Figure 2.14: National Insurance Registrations per 1,000, 2004-2017 
 
Source: NRS Local Area Migration 2017 
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Figure 2.15: NINO Registrations per 1,000, 2013-17 
 
Source: NRS Local Area Migration 2017 
 
 
UK Immigration Policy After Leaving The EU: Impacts on Scotland’s Economy, Population and Society 
 28 
These data all help us build up a picture of migration flows into different areas of 
Scotland. We can also use data on stocks of migrants to understand spatial 
distribution. Country of birth data from the 2011 census suggests that just under 14% 
of the population of the city council areas were born outside the UK in 2011. In the 
three other types of council area the percentage was less than 5%. By the time of 
the 2017 Population Estimates, the non-UK-born population in city council areas had 
risen to 17%, while in other types of areas the percentage ranged from 4.4% (in 
remote and island areas) to just over 6% in the mainly rural areas. 
 
 
2.4 Future immigration scenarios 
 
The task of this report is to consider how these migration dynamics might be affected 
by the proposed changes to free movement and UK immigration rules. Decisions on 
migration and settlement are extremely complex, as they are influenced by a range 
of economic and social conditions in both sending and receiving countries. This 
makes it difficult to predict how future policy changes might affect flows. The 
following factors are likely to influence flows of EU nationals over the coming years: 
 
• changing economic and social conditions in the main countries of origin of 
EU migrants; 
• changing economic and social conditions in the UK; 
• changes to UK immigration policy, including the cessation of free movement 
and adjustments to the immigration system. 
 
This report focuses on the third factor: changes to UK policy. Thus we examine how 
changes in free movement rights and UK immigration policy might influence 
migration flows to and from Scotland once the UK has left the EU. Clearly, we would 
not expect other social and economic conditions to remain the same. Indeed, recent 
trends in migration suggest that in-flows of EU nationals to the UK have already 
declined and outflows have increased, possibly in response to economic conditions 
in the UK and uncertainty about the future status of EU nationals in the UK.  Given 
uncertainties around the main drivers of migration, we will sketch out two scenarios, 
reflecting different expectations about the immigration decisions of EU nationals.  
 
In order to develop future migration scenarios, we start by defining a baseline 
projection that gives the assumed level of net migration in the absence of the 
proposed changes. Our baseline projection assumes that overseas migration flows 
will remain the same as they have been over the past five years (using the five-year 
averages for in- and out- migration). This figure, +13,000, is similar to the average 
net migration between 2001 and 2017 and lower than that in the last ten years. 
However, these estimates are still much higher than those of the NRS and ONS 
principal projection, which are based on the average for the previous 25 years.7 In 
our projections, we assume the same fertility, mortality and migration levels with the 
rest of the UK as the NRS and ONS principal projection. 
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Again basing figures on trends of the past five years, we assume 34,500 immigrants 
and 21,500 emigrants, implying overseas net migration at +13,000. Of this, we 
assume 15,500 immigrants come from EU countries annually, and 7,500 leave for 
the EU, with net migration of +8,000. A further 19,000 come from non-EU countries 
and 14,000 leave for non-EU countries per year, with net migration of +5,000. We 
further assume a similar breakdown of immigration by age (see Figure 2.7).  
 
This baseline is then adjusted in line with expected changes in patterns of migration 
following the proposed policy changes. We expect the major impact on international 
migration figures to occur in relation to EU immigration, the Tier 2 route, family 
migration, and long-term settlement decisions. We would also anticipate some 
changes following the introduction of temporary labour schemes for some sectors. 
However, we note that immigration through the proposed seasonal workers and 
transitional temporary routes would not be captured in international migration 
statistics as it would involve stays of less than 12 months. In the following sections, 
we outline the main changes we would expect to occur. 
 
EU migration for work 
 
The end of free movement rights after the UK leaves the EU means that citizens of 
other EU countries will no longer be entitled to access the UK labour market or to be 
self-employed, except where UK immigration rules allow. EU nationals may work in 
the UK subject to the immigration rules that apply to non-EU nationals, namely the 
UK points-based system. 
 
 
 
The current UK points-based system 
 
The UK points-based system comprises five tiers for different categories of economic 
migration from outside the EU.  Family migration and humanitarian migration routes 
(e.g. for asylum seekers) are dealt with outside the points-based system. 
 
• Tier 1 is for 'high-value migrants' and covers entry of entrepreneurs, investors, 
and a small quota of 'exceptional talent' visas.  
• Tier 2 is for 'skilled workers' with a job offer in the UK from an employer who will 
sponsor their application. It is the main route for workers outside the EU to 
enter the UK. 
• Tier 3 was intended for low-skilled workers but was never implemented. The 
requirement for low-skilled migrant workers in the UK labour market was largely 
met by EU nationals exercising free movement rights.  
• Tier 4 is for students who wish to study in the UK. Applicants must have a 
confirmed place at a registered UK educational establishment.  
• Tier 5 contains a variety of visa routes temporary workers, including creative, 
sporting, charity, and religious workers. The youth mobility scheme allowing 
young people to come to the UK on working holidays also sits within this tier.  
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Within Tier 1, the ‘Exceptional Talent’ track applies to leaders or emerging leaders in 
science, engineering, medicine, digital technology, arts and humanities. However, 
there is currently a cap of 2,000 on this channel and the White Paper does not 
propose lifting this cap. The ‘Entrepreneur’ and ‘Investment’ tracks apply to those 
with substantial funds to invest in the UK, and are not likely to apply to a large 
number of potential migrants; very few of the 7.5% of EU migrants who are 
self-employed would have been able to meet these conditions. The MAC estimates 
average annual income for self-employed EU nationals is well below £30,000. 
Although they make a significant contribution to value added, there are no new 
proposals in the White Paper as to the route by which EU nationals might become 
self-employed in the UK.  
 
Tier 2 is a route for skilled non-EU nationals, and is subject to skills and salary 
thresholds. As we saw in Chapter 1, the White Paper proposes abolishing the 
general cap on Tier 2 of 20,700 visas per year, and lowering the skills threshold to 
include medium-skilled jobs, while retaining the £30,000 salary threshold (or a lower 
threshold, subject to consultation).  
 
Data from the LFS suggests that around 78% of EU migrants in Scotland do not 
meet the Tier 2 salary threshold. Moreover, not all employers currently employing 
EU nationals in occupations that would meet the criteria would be willing or able to 
switch to recruitment under Tier 2, because of the additional transaction costs 
involved. This may be especially the case with smaller firms. The White Paper 
proposes alleviating these costs through abolishing the resident labour market test, 
and simplifying the sponsorship system. However, the transaction costs for 
employers will remain higher than current costs for employing EU nationals, and the 
Tier 2 route is also likely to be less attractive to EU nationals than the current free 
movement framework. 
 
At the same time, an expansion and simplification of Tier 2 would also enable a 
wider range of employers to recruit greater numbers of non-EU nationals who meet 
the threshold, potentially increasing inflows of non-EU migrants via this route. So 
while the changes may lead to a decrease in EU workers coming to the UK, they 
may encourage an expansion of skilled non-EU workers. 
 
The White Paper projects that these changes would lead to an 80% reduction in 
EU immigration to the UK for the purpose of work. Our scenario assumes a more 
moderate reduction of 70%, but taking into account a possible expansion of 
non-EU migrants through Tier 2. Thus we would anticipate that the decrease in 
EU workers willing or able to enter through Tier 2 would be partially offset by the 
removal of the cap, the lower skills threshold, and reduction of transaction costs for 
employers, which is likely to increase the number of non-EU nationals entering 
through Tier 2. For the sake of simplicity, we include this expanded level of 
non-EU immigration within our 30% figure. 
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Family migration 
 
Under current provisions on EU free movement, workers may be accompanied by 
family members, including extended family (parents of non-minors). With the 
cessation of free movement, the rights of workers to be joined by families would be 
aligned with the rights of non-EU nationals in the UK. This implies that only 
dependent children and partners will be allowed to join their family, and the 
sponsoring partner or carer will need to meet a salary threshold (£18,600 for a 
sponsoring partner, £22,400 for partner and child, and an additional £2,400 for each 
further child). We would expect some EU nationals to enter via this family route. 
 
Tier 2 entrants may also be accompanied by partners and dependent children. Data 
on the number of dependents joining non-UK nationals under Tiers 1 and 2 shows 
that for every Tier 1 entrant, 2.2 dependent visas are issued; compared to 
0.7 dependent visas for every Tier 2 entrant.8 We assume these figures would be 
similar for future EU nationals entering under these schemes. It is worth noting that 
Tier 2 dependents and entrants through the family migration route are not restricted 
in the jobs they may take up, so some may work in occupations that do not meet the 
Tier 2 salary or skills threshold. 
 
Taking these two routes together (family migration and dependents under Tier 2), 
our scenario assumes that future EU family migration would be at a rate of 
approximately 70% of anticipated EU Tier 2 inflows.  
 
Long-term stay and settlement 
 
Entry under UK immigration rules is also more restricted in terms of pathways to 
long-term or permanent settlement. EU nationals currently have access to settled 
status if they can show they have been continually resident for 5 years. It is difficult 
to predict how many EU nationals currently in the UK or arriving before the end of 
2020 will take up the opportunity to settle in the UK. Survey data on the intentions of 
EU migrants suggests that the prospect of leaving the EU is affecting the mobility 
decisions of many EU nationals in the UK.9 However, it is also possible that potential 
EU immigrants might have incentives to relocate to the UK before the end of the 
implementation period, given the opportunity to achieve settled status. And a 
proportion of those already in the UK may decide to apply for settled status in order 
to keep their mobility options open. 
 
The opportunities for longer-term and permanent settlement are more restricted 
under Tier 2. Entrants may apply for settled status after five years, but this is 
premised on continued employment over five years, and carries a higher processing 
fee. The White Paper’s proposal for temporary labour migration and seasonal 
agriculture are far more restricted, effectively ruling out the possibility to stay longer 
than 12 months. We can consider how the changes might affect future settlement 
decisions of EU nationals by looking at data on non-EU nationals entering through 
the points-based system. We assume a partial convergence of rates of out-migration 
by EU nationals to that of non-EU nationals, given that EU nationals would be 
subject to similar rules on settlement. On this basis, we assume an outflow rate of 
EU nationals of 50%, following the introduction of the new rules.  
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2.5 Two scenarios for future migration to Scotland 
 
Building on these assumptions, we now set out two main scenarios for future annual 
EU flows over the five years following the implementation period (2021-26) after the 
UK leaves the EU. The first scenario is based on the projection set out in the White 
Paper, which estimates an 80% reduction in EU labour immigration. The White 
Paper analysis assumes a similar rate of return migration of EU nationals, so for the 
sake of simplicity we also assume an 80% reduction of net migration. Applying these 
figures to our baseline projection, the first scenario projects a reduction in current EU 
inflows to Scotland from +15,500 per year to +3,100 per year; and a reduction in net 
EU flows from +8,000 to +1,600. 
 
Our second scenario assumes a more moderate 50% reduction in net migration of 
EU nationals. This is based on the assumptions set out above, namely: 
 
• a 70% decrease in current EU inflows for work (incorporating an anticipated 
increase in non-EU immigration under Tier 2); 
• immigration of Tier 2 dependents and family migrants at 70% of the level of 
Tier 2 immigration; 
• student immigration remaining constant; and 
• an outflow rate of 50% of inflows. 
 
These assumptions yield projected net migration of EU nationals at +4,000. Taking 
EU and non-EU flows together, this suggests a decline in overall net migration to 
Scotland of roughly 50% (scenario 1) or 30% (scenario 2). 
 
 
Table 2.3: Net international migration scenarios for Scotland, 2021-41 
  Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
EU net migration +8,000 +1,600 +4,000 
Non-EU net migration +5,000 +5,000 +5,000 
Total net migration +13,000 +6,600 +9,000 
 
 
As noted, these projected scenarios are indicative, given both the lack of robust data 
on current inflows and outflows, and the challenges in anticipating how social, 
economic and policy changes will affect the decision-making of immigrants and 
employers. Nevertheless, these scenarios help us estimate the changes in 
Scotland’s population, if EU migration were to be significantly reduced from its 
current level. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed analysis of the labour market effects of the 
changes, including on particular sectors and local areas. Chapter 4 considers the 
fiscal impacts of the changes, in the context of the Scottish Government assuming 
new tax and social security powers.  Chapter 5 assesses the demographic 
implications of the changes, looking at the Scotland-wide figure as well as different 
types of local areas. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the broader social impacts of these 
projected changes on communities in different types of areas.  
 
3
Labour market effects
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3 Labour Market Effects 
 
This chapter focuses on the impacts of the proposed Tier 2 changes on the Scottish 
labour market. Having established the size and distribution of the contributions that 
migrants make to the Scottish labour market in Chapter 2, we now consider how 
labour migration may be affected by the proposals contained in the White Paper.  
 
 
3.1 Tier 2 Skills and Income Thresholds 
 
The White Paper proposes abolishing the general cap on Tier 2, and lowering the 
skills threshold to include medium-skilled jobs at RQF3 or above. This is likely to 
expand the use of Tier 2, both by removing restrictions on the number of people 
employed, and increasing the range of eligible occupations. The removal of the 
resident labour market test and simplification in the sponsorship system may make 
the use of Tier 2 more appealing to a wider range of employers. The distribution of 
RQF levels in Scotland by country of birth is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Those born outside the UK tend to be more concentrated at the extremes of the 
qualifications distribution. Thus, for example, the proportion of those born in the EU 
who hold a PhD is more than three times the equivalent UK share. But the proportion 
of unskilled labour from the EU-10 countries is more than double the UK proportion. 
This implies that there are likely to be fewer migrants in the middle of the income 
distribution than there are UK-born. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) and Country of Birth 
 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 2013-2017 
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Table 3.1 shows estimated annual earnings in Scotland by country of birth and level 
of qualification based on the LFS 2013-2017 dataset. Consistent with the argument 
above, the range of earnings is wider for those born outside the UK than the 
UK-born. For example, median earnings for those born in the EU-15 with PhD level 
qualifications exceeds £54,200 while their low-skilled counterparts earn only 
£16,900. These compare with £35,200 and £18,500 for equivalent levels of skill 
among the UK-born. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Median Annual Salary by Level of Qualification and Country of Birth 
  
PhD RQF6 RQF4 RQF3 RQF3 
Lower-
skilled All 
UK £35,200 £34,400 £25,600 £23,100 £18,100 £14,500 £20,900 
EU-15 £54,200 £30,100 £22,900 £24,100 £14,100 £16,900 £22,800 
EU-10 £40,200 £31,700 N/A £18,300 £13,300 £14,600 £14,800 
Non-EU £35,100 £32,700 £23,100 £22,600 £15,700 £14,100 £19,000 
All £35,200 £34,200 £25,300 £23,100 £17,600 £14,500 £20,800 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 2013-2017 
 
The White Paper proposes a £30,000 salary threshold for Tier 2 migrants (or a lower 
threshold, subject to consultation). The LFS estimate of overall median earnings in 
Scotland for the 2013-17 period is £20,800. Table 3.2 also shows that median 
earnings for both UK and non-UK workers, with skill level RQF4 or less, falls well 
short of the proposed salary threshold. However, median earnings are not 
informative about the proportion of the distribution that exceeds the threshold. In 
addition, the survey data from the LFS is potentially subject to bias for a number of 
reasons such as the level of proxy responses and low response rates at the upper 
and lower ends of the earnings distribution. It is difficult to assess the direction of 
these biases. In the remainder of the chapter, we analyse the implications of the 
proposed threshold in more detail, but for this analysis we rely on the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), which is collected by the ONS and is based on 
employer records rather than survey data. 
 
 
3.2 Effects on different sectors 
 
We identify the types of work and worker likely to be most affected by the proposed 
restrictions on EU migration by analysing the distribution of annual earnings in 
Scotland for different groups within the workforce. We focus in particular on the 
proportion of employees whose annual earnings exceed the proposed income 
threshold.  
 
The calculations are based on published tables from ASHE 2018 . Note that our 
analysis is restricted to employees, given that income data for the self-employed is 
not available in this dataset. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of gross annual 
earnings in Scotland in 2018 based on ASHE. The tables contain data on the 10th, 
20th, 30th etc. percentiles of this distribution. We fit a quadratic function to these 
percentiles to interpolate the proportion of earnings that are less than specified 
income thresholds. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Annual Earnings in Scotland 2018
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2018 
 
 
The results show that around 63% of all employees in Scotland earn less than 
£30,000 and therefore fall below the proposed Tier 2 income threshold. To assess 
the implications of alternative threshold measures, we also carry out sensitivity 
analyses for lower thresholds of £27,500 and £25,000. In these cases, 58% and 53% 
of Scottish employees earn less than £27,500 and £25,000 respectively. 
 
For a more detailed analysis, we first analyse the distribution of earnings by 
occupation. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of jobs in broad occupational groups 
where annual earnings exceed thresholds again set at £30,000, £27,500 and 
£25,000. The results show that over 70% of jobs in science, research, engineering 
and technology have earnings exceeding the £30,000 threshold. Reducing the 
threshold to £25,000 increases this proportion to almost 90%. At the other end of the 
earnings spectrum, it is unlikely that any jobs in secretarial work, textiles, social care, 
leisure and travel, sales and elementary occupations would qualify if the Tier 2 
income threshold was set at £30,000. Reducing the threshold to either £27,500 or 
£25,000 makes relatively little difference since these are low-wage occupations. 
Even the application of a lower Tier 2 income threshold would effectively bar non-UK 
migrants from these occupations. 
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Figure 3.3: Proportions of Jobs with Incomes Exceeding Thresholds of £30,000, 
£27,500, and £25,000 by Occupation in 2018 
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2018  
 
 
These calculations include both UK-born and non-UK born workers in Scotland, 
since the ASHE dataset does not record country of birth. There is considerable 
overlap between low-wage occupations and occupations which employ a large share 
of migrant workers (see Chapter 2). For example, earnings in cleaning, processing 
and hospitality are typically low: they also employ a relatively large share of EU-10 
workers. Recruitment to these occupations, particularly where turnover is high, is 
likely to be challenging if the proposed Tier 2 limit is adopted.  
 
Scottish employers may respond to labour shortages by increasing investment, 
enhancing the skill levels of existing employees, more active recruiting of UK-born 
workers and/or increasing wage rates. Almost all of these courses of action would 
lead to increased costs. These may be passed on to consumers if market conditions 
permit. If they cannot be passed on, profitability would suffer. 
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The White Paper on migration argues that the increased availability of labour 
resulting from free movement within the EU has led to an overreliance on low-paid 
migrant workers. In order to reduce this reliance, it proposes that employers of 
migrants earning close to the £30,000 threshold might simply increase their wages 
above this threshold, but it explicitly avoids discussing the consequences of such 
adjustments for costs, competitiveness and ultimately for economic output. 
Reductions in labour supply that follow from the application of a salary threshold to 
EU migration may generate increased investment in both capital and skills but how 
far these are economically viable will vary both by occupation and location. 
 
These issues will confront Scottish employers to varying degrees in industries that 
are dependent on EU workers. Some of the challenges for sectors have been 
highlighted by organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry, the 
Federation of Small Businesses, the Scottish Tourism Alliance, Care Scotland and 
National Farmers’ Union Scotland. In the next sections we provide examples of two 
sectors in Scotland that are likely to be negatively affected by the changes to 
immigration rules. 
 
 
3.2 The cases of Social Care and Seasonal Agriculture  
 
Social Care 
 
One part of Scotland’s economy likely to be substantially affected by new regulations 
on EU migration is the social care sector. The demand for care, particularly for older 
people, has grown substantially in recent years. We would expect that growth to 
continue. Our projections show that between 2016 and 2037, the number of those 
aged 80 and over in Scotland will increase by 68% (see Chapter 4). Increased 
demand for care provision will follow, given the prevalence of frailty and long-term 
health conditions in this age group. 
 
The social care sector combines a number of unusual features: 
 
• It is largely monopsonistic, with many suppliers and one dominant group of 
purchasers – local authorities. This structure has resulted in downward 
pressure on prices, impairing profitability and driving many providers out of the 
market. Local authorities are the principal providers because individuals 
typically do not have enough savings to meet care costs. Further, the budgets 
of local authorities across the UK have seen substantial reductions over the 
past years.  However, the share of self-funding residents, who do cover the full 
costs of their care, is lower in Scotland than in England, which makes Scottish 
providers more reliant on local authority supported clients.  
• These developments have inevitably affected the wages that care providers are 
able to offer. Workers in monopsonistic industries are typically low-paid, and 
the recent budgetary squeeze has added to the downward pressure on care 
workers’ wages. The Scottish Government has partially alleviated this pressure 
by supporting the introduction of the Living Wage in the care sector.  
• Low wages have reduced the incentive for care workers to invest in training 
and the inability of care providers to make normal profits has reduced their 
capacity to subsidise workers’ training. 
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• The care sector does not lend itself easily to capital/labour substitution. It is a 
labour-intensive sector with little immediate prospect of technical change. 
Artificial intelligence is a long way from providing empathetic companionship, 
which is an essential component of the care worker’s vocation. Neither is this 
skill valued in the current migration proposals. 
• It is not clear that the market price for care reflects its true societal value, even 
if the market were competitive.  Research has estimated that the value of 
unpaid family caregiving is equivalent to between 20% and 36% of GDP.10 
Feminist economists have long argued that care is not properly dealt with in 
conventional GDP accounting and that governments, as evidenced by their 
policy choices, have consistently failed to recognise its important contribution to 
social welfare. 
 
Given its unique structure, there is a strong case that the wages paid to care workers 
are an inadequate reflection of their contribution to societal welfare. However, the UK 
Government’s migration proposals elide market wages and societal value. The 
proposals for classifying potential migrants are based solely on market wages. 
 
The care sector in Scotland currently faces many challenges, including a significant 
excess demand for care workers. This is evidenced by the most recent Scottish Care 
employer survey, which indicated that 77% of care homes were having recruitment 
difficulties.11 There are staff vacancies of around 20% in nursing posts in care 
homes.  
 
EU workers make up a significant proportion of Scotland’s care workforce. Our 
estimate from the LFS is that since 2015, around 9.1% of the workforce were born 
outside the UK, with 38.5% of these coming from the EU. This estimate is lower than 
that of Care Scotland: the LFS estimate may be biased downwards if its postcode-
based sampling frame fails to capture adequately the addresses of migrants. Care 
Scotland reports that EU workers have been a particular target for recruitment to the 
sector in recent years, although difficulties have been experienced recently on 
recruitment due to the negative effects of preparations for the UK’s departure from 
the EU. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the 2018 ASHE data suggests that less than 10% of those 
working in “Caring and personal service occupations” in Scotland earn £25,000, and 
none earn more than £30,000. Under current Home Office regulations, the majority 
of care workers are classed as ‘lower skilled,’12 and therefore would also not qualify 
under the proposal to extend the skilled route for migrants to RQF3+ (Highers or 
equivalent) provided that they meet the £30,000 per annum income threshold.13 
 
The White Paper proposes that workers at any skill level coming from unspecified 
“low risk” countries would continue to have access to the UK labour market for a 
limited period of time, to be reviewed in 2025. This would enable employers in the 
care sector to continue to seek workers from Europe. But these workers could only 
be offered a 12-month contract, and would have no access to public funds or 
entitlement to bring dependents. After the initial 12-month period, re-entry would not 
be possible until a further 12 months had elapsed. These terms are unlikely to be 
attractive to prospective EU recruits to the sector, and are therefore likely to further 
exacerbate the difficulties facing care service providers. 
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The care sector is already experiencing high staff turnover, with the added stress of 
covering existing vacancies leading to more staff leaving the sector.  Even if there 
were an adequate supply of staff from EU countries, the 12-month tenure limit will 
prevent them from building a significant career in the UK. This will contribute to 
continuing instability within the sector, and will make it more challenging to adjust to 
the rapid growth in the number of older people in Scotland that will occur over the 
next decade. Instability in this sector may also have knock-on effects for the NHS by 
increasing delayed discharge if social care options are constrained by staff 
shortages. This would have an adverse effect both on NHS finances and on patient 
outcomes. 
 
Finally, previous analyses of the costs and benefits of migration have largely failed to 
account for the economic impact of substitution between paid and unpaid care. If 
there are insufficient paid-for care workers to meet demand, the likely response is an 
increase in unpaid care by friends and family, some of which will result in reduced 
labour market participation. Recent research finds that unpaid care has a negative 
effect both on working time and wages and that this effect is particularly pronounced 
for women.14 Thus, female care providers decrease working time by between three 
and ten hours per week and face a wage rate 3% lower than non-caregivers. The 
implication is that a restriction on the supply of care workers is likely to adversely 
affect the labour market prospects of friends and family, particularly female family 
members. The fiscal effects of this substitution will be reduced income tax revenues 
and higher payments of welfare benefits. There are also likely to be higher health 
costs, since caregiving tends to have adverse health impacts.15 
 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
 
Employers of seasonal agricultural workers in Scotland will face additional 
challenges if the supply of such workers is significantly constrained. Around 9,300 
seasonal workers were engaged in Scottish agriculture in 2017.16 They were 
particularly concentrated in fruit production. This sector has been an important 
source of growth within Scottish agriculture in recent years (see Figure 3.4). The 
value of its output grew to almost £140 million in 2017, while the volume of 
production has more than tripled since 2003. Food production in general has been 
growing more rapidly in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. 
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Figure 3.4: Fruit Production in Scotland by Value of Production, 2003-2017 (£m) 
 
Source: Economic Report on Scottish Agriculture 2018 
 
 
A recent survey of the sector indicated that labour shortages were evident in 2017, 
with 48% of respondents indicating that they had difficulty harvesting due to labour 
shortages.17 Without access to sufficient seasonal labour 58% of respondents were 
‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to downsize their business, while 42% would cease their current 
activity. Other actions, such as increasing wages or seeking more capital-intensive 
production methods, were favoured by 61% and 52% of respondents respectively 
(the categories were not exclusive). However, there are no viable mechanical 
options currently available to harvest soft fruit.  
 
The UK Government proposes that existing arrangements for seasonal workers will 
continue until the end of the implementation period if an exit deal is agreed between 
the UK and the EU. In the event of a no deal, the UK Government has committed to 
temporary transitional arrangements lasting until 31 December 2020. Thus 
employers should be able to continue hiring workers from the EU. However, Scottish 
fruit businesses have already been forced to abandon production due to shortages of 
staff. The current uncertainty over migration arrangements is likely to make hiring EU 
workers even more challenging.  
 
The UK Government proposal under no deal is that workers wishing to stay for more 
than three months will have to apply to the Home Office for leave to remain within 
three months of their arrival. Leave to remain will normally be granted for 36 months 
and this will include permission to work. However, in choosing where to work, 
potential migrants will weigh up the costs of this procedure against alternatives within 
the EU that do not involve such bureaucratic hurdles, the outcome of which cannot 
be predicted with certainty. This suggests that existing recruitment difficulties are 
only likely to become more acute. 
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To allay producer concerns, the UK Government has established a pilot scheme for 
non-EU seasonal workers. This will operate in 2019-20 and will involve up to 2,500 
workers from outside the EU. In line with the MAC recommendation, the scheme is 
expected to require that workers be paid at a rate above the minimum wage so that it 
should not be seen as an ‘easy option’ for employers. The visas issued under this 
scheme are expected to cover the whole of the UK. The quota is far lower than the 
21,250 workers admitted annually in the previous SAWS, which ran until 2016. 
Under that scheme, around 14.6% of the workers admitted were employed in 
Scotland, predominantly in Angus (1,143, or 5.7% of the UK total), Perth and Kinross 
(4.8%), Fife (2.3%) and Aberdeenshire (1.4%).18 If we assume a similar proportion of 
14.6% under the new scheme, that would imply just 365 workers coming to Scotland 
under the pilot. This will clearly not come close to replacing the EU workers that have 
been regularly coming to Scotland in recent years, and without whom this sector of 
Scottish agriculture cannot be sustained in its present form. Unless the pilot is 
significantly expanded, this sector which is currently thriving will be forced into less 
profitable alternatives.  
 
Producers have the option of local recruitment, but this appears unlikely to succeed 
unless wages are increased to a level that makes the final product uncompetitive. 
And in the absence of a mechanical harvesting solution, at least in the short term, 
the likely response is for producers to convert to other forms of production. Given the 
revealed preference for fruit production, these alternatives are likely to be less 
profitable. Agricultural policy as a whole will be in a state of flux as a result of leaving 
the EU, and these developments are likely to weaken business confidence in 
Scottish agriculture, which provides an important underpinning for Scotland’s rapidly 
growing food and drink sector. 
 
 
3.3 Migrant Characteristics and Income Thresholds 
 
Applying a uniform income threshold will change the composition of EU migrants to 
Scotland due to the differential effects of a single threshold on different types of 
workers. In this section, we consider how the income threshold may affect the age, 
gender and spatial balance of EU migrants to Scotland. 
 
As we have shown in Chapter 2, migrants to Scotland (and rUK) have typically 
been young, with net migrant flows dominated by those aged 20-29. This is in 
line with standard human capital theory, which suggests that most migrants move 
in order to improve their prospects and therefore will do so before they reach their 
peak earnings. This implies that they will find it more difficult to meet income 
threshold requirements than older workers who have reached their peak earnings 
level. The MAC recommended lower salary thresholds for young people and the 
UK Government has accepted this. In its recent White Paper it argued that 
‘graduate entrant jobs are already subject to a lower salary threshold and we 
intend to continue with that approach to ensure that those at the start of their 
careers are able to access the job market.’19 The current threshold for new 
entrants within the general Tier 2 route, and graduate trainees within Tier 2 
(intra-company transfer), is set at £23,000.  
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Figure 3.5 is also drawn from the 2018 ASHE data. It shows the proportion of jobs 
that are held by different age groups and which exceed the Tier 2 £30,000 income 
threshold. It is for the UK as a whole rather than Scotland because ONS does not 
publish data on earnings by region and age. Nevertheless, patterns for Scotland are 
likely to be very similar to those for the UK as a whole. It shows that only around one 
quarter of jobs held by those aged 22-29 receive earnings that exceed £30,000. This 
proportion rises sharply for those in their 30s and 40s, but migration is much less 
common amongst these age groups. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Proportion of UK employees with earnings in excess of £30,000 by age 
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2018 
 
 
The Tier 2 salary threshold will have a disproportionate effect on the supply of 
female migrants. Figure 3.6 shows the proportion of jobs held by women where 
earnings exceed £30,000 per annum.20 The proportions for women are much lower 
than those for all workers shown in Figure 3.3, which suggests that women wishing 
to migrate to Scotland for employment purposes will be significantly less likely than 
men to earn sufficient to qualify under the Tier 2 proposals.  
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of female employees in  Scotland with annual earnings in 
excess of £30,000, £27,500 and £25,000 
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2018  
 
 
This in turn has implications for the supply of labour to particular occupations, given 
that female employment tends to be clustered in a relatively small number of 
occupations. There is a wide range of occupations where the proportion earning 
more than a significantly lower threshold of £25,000 is zero. Those occupations 
where even a moderate proportion of women earn above £30,000 tend to be in 
professional and/or public sector jobs. 
 
 
  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Elementary cleaning occupations
Other elementary services occupations
Elementary administration and service occupations
Sales assistants and retail cashiers
Elementary occupations
Sales occupations
Childcare and related personal services
Sales and customer service occupations
Secretarial and related occupations
Secretarial and related occupations
Caring personal service occupations
Caring, leisure and other service occupations
Administrative occupations
Administrative and secretarial occupations
All
Nursing and midwifery professionals
Public services and other associate professionals
Associate professional and technical occupations
Health professionals
Business and public service associate professionals
Managers, directors and senior officials
Professional occupations
Corporate managers and directors
Business, media and public service professionals
Teaching and educational professionals
£30,000 £27,500 £25,000
UK Immigration Policy After Leaving The EU: Impacts on Scotland’s Economy, Population and Society 
 44 
3.4 Spatial Effects 
 
We now examine how the threshold might affect the geographical distribution of 
migrants across different areas of Scotland. We analysed differences in income 
across Scotland’s local authorities. Figure 3.7 shows the proportions of employee 
annual earnings which exceeded £30,000, £27,500 or £25,000 in 2018. There is 
wide variation in this proportion across Scotland’s local authorities, ranging from 
16% in Na h-Eileanan Siar to 50% in East Renfrewshire. This suggests that few 
potential migrants to areas such as Na h-Eileanan Siar, Dumfries and Galloway or 
Clackmannanshire would find jobs with pay levels sufficient to qualify under the 
proposed Tier 2 thresholds. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Proportion of employees in  Scottish local authorities with annual 
earnings in excess of  £30,000, £27,500, and £25,000 in 2018 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2018  
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Figure 3.7 also shows that relaxing the Tier 2 income threshold to £27,500 or 
£25,000 would substantially increase the range of jobs available to migrants. If the 
threshold is reduced to £25,000, only five local authorities would have less than 40% 
of jobs meeting this threshold.  
 
This variation within Scotland is of course repeated elsewhere in the UK. The White 
Paper proposes that there should be no variation in the income threshold across the 
UK. Given that it is also acknowledged that migration generally has a beneficial 
effect on productivity, the lack of access to migrants in areas that already experience 
low levels of productivity as evidenced by their low wages will further exacerbate 
economic and social inequality within the UK. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the proportion of female jobs where earnings exceed £30,000 per 
annum by local authority. Again there is wide variation across local authorities 
suggesting that the opportunities for females to migrate to different parts of Scotland 
to work varies greatly.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Proportion of female employees in Scottish local authority areas with 
annual earnings in excess of £30,000 in 201821 
 
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
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Summary and Implications 
 
The proposed changes to free movement and to Tier 2 are likely to significantly 
reduce inflows of EU migrants for the purpose of work. Analysis using ASHE data 
shows that 63% of employees in Scotland (both UK and non-UK nationals) earn less 
than the Tier 2 salary threshold of £30,000. If we take possible alternative salary 
thresholds, the proportions would be 58% (earning less than £27,500) and 53% 
(earning less than £25,000).  
 
This threshold would affect sectors differentially. In some sectors, such as science, 
research, engineering and technology, 70% of employees earn over £30,000. By 
contrast, it is highly unlikely that any jobs in secretarial work, textiles, social care, 
leisure and travel, sales and elementary occupations would quality for the £30,000 
threshold. We analysed  two sectors that are likely to be detrimentally affected: 
social care and seasonal agriculture. In the social care sector, less than 10% of 
those in caring personal service occupations in Scotland earn above £25,000, and 
none earn £30,000. The budgetary pressures faced by local authorities, the main 
purchaser of social care services, mean that there is little prospect of raising salaries 
in social care to a level that would attract UK workers. The brunt of these shortages 
is likely to be borne by friends and family who will have to assume responsibility for 
care, and especially female family members, whose labour market prospects will be 
detrimentally affected. 
 
We also looked at the distribution of salaries across age groups, gender, and region. 
Most of those earning above £30,000 are in their 30s to 40s, with a much smaller 
proportion (25%) of people in the 22-29 age group earning at this level. Given that 
migrants tend to be younger than the average population, only a small portion are 
likely to qualify under the proposed Tier 2 scheme.  
 
We also found a significant gender differential in the distribution of salaries, with a 
lower proportion of women earning over £30,000 across almost all sectors. Many of 
the occupations in which women work would not meet the £30,000 or even a 
potential £25,000 threshold, implying that the proposed Tier 2 arrangements would 
create a gender disparity in the supply of future migrants. 
 
Finally, there are striking divergences in how salary levels are distributed across 
areas of Scotland. Thus while 49.5% employees in East Renfrewshire earn above 
£30,000, only 16% reach this threshold in Na h-Eileanan Siar. This implies that very 
few immigrants would be able to move to less prosperous local authorities under 
Tier 2 income thresholds. This would limit labour migration in areas of Scotland that 
already experience low levels of productivity and face challenges of depopulation.  
 
 
 
4
Fiscal effects
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4. Fiscal Effects 
 
 
This chapter analyses the potential effects of reduced EU immigration to Scotland on 
Scotland’s budget. Fiscal impacts are relevant to Scotland both because of the 
extensive spending powers already held by the Scottish Parliament and because of 
the new tax and welfare powers which it has assumed following the Scotland Act 
2016. 
 
 
4.1 Static and dynamic approaches to estimating fiscal impact 
 
Reductions in EU migration to Scotland would affect Scotland’s budget both by 
reducing tax revenues and by cutting demand for public services. The size of these 
effects will be determined by the overall change in net migration.  
 
Analysis of fiscal impacts needs to begin with an evaluation of the current balance of 
migrant tax revenues and their use of public services in a given fiscal year – the 
so-called static assessment. This contrasts with the dynamic or life cycle approach, 
where revenues and costs are viewed over the length of time the individual is 
expected to remain in the UK. Estimates of longer-term fiscal effects are reliant on 
strong assumptions about migrants’ future tax contributions and their future use of 
public services. Note that the static approach treats the cost of educating children as 
part of the parent’s public service costs. With the life-cycle approach, migrants and 
their children are treated separately.  
 
A detailed analysis of both the static and dynamic approaches to estimating 
migrants’ net fiscal impact was carried out for the MAC by Oxford Economics.22 For 
the static analysis, it found that EU-15 migrants made an estimated net contribution 
of £3,740 to the UK fiscal balance in 2016-17, while EU-10 migrants made a net 
contribution of £1,040. In its dynamic analysis, the study found that EU migrants 
contributed a net £78,000 to the UK public finances, discounted over their lifetimes. 
The life-cycle contribution of EU and non-EU migrants who joined the UK labour 
market in 2016 was estimated to be £26.9 billion. 
 
We were not able to carry out a similarly detailed analysis of the fiscal impacts of EU 
migrants in Scotland because of both time and data limitations. However, we were 
able to compare and contrast the characteristics of EU migrants in Scotland with 
those in the rest of the UK to derive broad conclusions about the applicability of the 
MAC analysis suitably scaled to Scotland. This discussion therefore concentrates on 
the relative impact of EU migrants on fiscal outcomes in Scotland compared with the 
rest of the UK.   
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First, we consider the relative magnitude of migrants’ impact on tax revenues. Only 
around 8% of those currently resident in Scotland were born outside the UK. In the 
rest of the UK, this proportion is close to 16%. However, EU migrants make up a 
much larger proportion of Scotland’s migrant population. While those born in the EU 
comprise 39% of migrants in the rest of the UK, they form 50% of Scotland’s 
migrants. In 2017-18, EU migrants comprised 4.9% of the total Scottish population 
compared with 6.8% in the rest of the UK. Unless there are significant differences in 
net fiscal contributions at the individual level, this implies that the aggregate fiscal 
impact of EU migrants is smaller in Scotland than in the rest of the UK.  
 
At the individual level, earnings are pivotal to the generation of both direct and 
indirect tax revenues. And since current earnings tend to be good predictors of future 
earnings, today’s wages not only provide the basis for the static assessment of 
migrants’ fiscal impact, they also drive the dynamic assessment. Table 4.1 shows 
estimates of average weekly earnings drawn from the Labour Force Survey over the 
period 2016-2018. The estimates cover those born in the UK, EU-15, EU-10 or other 
foreign-born nationals who are resident either in Scotland or in the rest of the UK.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Average Weekly Earnings by Area of Birth and Residence (2016-2018) 
 Scotland rUK 
UK £478.60 £494.70 
Non-EU £543.70 £627.90 
EU-15 £363.80 £401.30 
EU-10 £488.20 £544.20 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 2016-18 
 
 
Consistent with other data sources, the earnings of those born in the UK and 
resident in Scotland are around 3.3% lower than those born in the UK and resident 
elsewhere in the UK.  The gap in migrant earnings is typically much larger, with 
those born in the EU-15 earning 13.3% less and those born in the EU-10 earning 
9.3% less if resident in Scotland rather than in the rest of the UK. Lower earnings are 
likely to result in lower revenue generation, but the differential depends not only on 
the difference in mean earnings, but also their distribution. This distribution will 
interact with the Tier 2 salary limit to determine total tax revenues. 
 
The range of taxes covered by the MAC assessment of the fiscal impact of migrants 
comprised income tax and national insurance, value-added tax, excise duties, fuel 
duties, air passenger tax, insurance premium tax, customs duties, betting taxes, 
vehicle excise and stamp duty on house purchases. The Scottish Government has a 
range of devolved tax responsibilities. Income tax, which is forecast to raise 
£11.7 billion in 2019-20, is by far the most important of these revenue sources.23 
Income tax collected from migrants resident in Scotland who are designated as 
‘Scottish taxpayers’ by HMRC depends principally on their income, but will also be 
affected by their status (employed or self-employed), whether they are working, and 
by the size of any tax-free contributions that they make to, for example, pensions. 
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For the dynamic assessment, where an estimate is made of lifetime tax revenues, 
starting age plays an important role. Migrants who join a new workforce at the 
beginning of their working life can generate more tax revenues over their careers in 
the destination country than those who migrate later. As we saw in previous 
chapters, EU migrants to Scotland are typically younger than those who move to the 
rest of the UK. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.1, which shows the share of each 
age group in the relevant population by migrant status and area of residence. The 
data are drawn from LFS data, so it should be noted that the samples are small. It is 
apparent that EU-10 migrants to Scotland, with more than 30% of their number in the 
16-29 age range, are younger both than the UK-born and other migrants.  
 
Scotland has a larger share in this age range from both the EU-15 and the EU-10 
migrant groups. Thus it is not surprising that the mean age of non-UK EU-15 
migrants living in Scotland is 3.7 years less than those resident in the rest of the UK: 
the equivalent age gaps for EU-10 migrants is 1.7 years. If migrants, having arrived 
in Scotland at an earlier age compared with the rest of the UK, also stay longer 
(leaving at the same mean age as those in the rest of the UK), their lower levels of 
earnings will be somewhat offset in the dynamic assessment by their having an 
extended contribution period. However, there are no readily available statistics to 
enable comparisons of migrant lengths of stay across different parts of the UK. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Age Groups by Size, Area of Birth and Current Residence within UK 
 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 2016-18 
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Age is also an important predictor of the use of public services. Health and social 
care expenditure, in particular, rises steeply with age. Figure 4.2 also shows that a 
lower proportion of migrants in Scotland are aged 65+. This migrant age group 
comprises 1.9% of the UK population, but only 0.7% of the Scottish population. 
Amongst those in employment or who are limited by health or disability in seeking 
work, a lower proportion in Scotland (23.8%) report health problems compared to the 
rest of the UK (26.3%). This again may reflect the younger mean age of migrants in 
Scotland. This broadly suggests that EU migrants to Scotland are less likely to place 
significant burdens on the health system compared with the rest of the UK. 
 
In the static assessment, these differences may partly offset the effect of lower 
earnings on the net fiscal balance compared with the rest of the UK. The dynamic 
case is again uncertain in the absence of information on differences in mean migrant 
length of stay between Scotland and the UK.  
 
Although EU migrants in Scotland may make less use of the health and social care 
systems, they may use other public services more intensively. Education is an 
obvious candidate. In the static analysis, the MAC approach is to focus on the 
‘accountable adult’, whose usage of public services includes public service costs 
incurred by dependents. Given the age distribution of EU migrants, this will 
principally be children’s consumption of education services. Household composition 
provides a first approximation to differences in levels of demand for education 
services. Figure 4.2 shows household composition by area of birth and area of 
residence within the UK.  These estimates are derived from LFS data covering the 
period 2015-2018 to generate a large sample. Although there is a higher proportion 
of migrants to Scotland that are single or living as unrelated adults, the proportion of 
all migrants that are married or cohabiting with dependent children is exactly the 
same (37%) in Scotland as in rUK.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Household Composition by Area of Birth and Current Residence in UK 
 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 
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Although this evidence is indirect and neglects issues such as differences in age and 
number of children, it suggests that there are unlikely to be substantial differences in 
the take-up of educational services between ‘accountable adult’ EU migrants in 
Scotland and those in the rest of the UK. 
 
The general conclusion from this analysis is that the net fiscal contribution of 
EU migrants to Scotland is likely to be less positive than that for EU migrants across 
the UK as a whole. While the characteristics of EU migrants in Scotland and the rest 
of the UK are in many respects similar, lower wages in Scotland are likely to be the 
main driver of a lower net fiscal contribution. However, wages for the UK-born 
population are lower in Scotland than in the rest of the UK and hence the relative 
fiscal contribution of EU migrants is still likely to be positive. 
 
 
4.2 Distribution of fiscal costs and benefits 
 
We now consider how the fiscal costs and benefits of migration are shared between 
the Scottish and UK Governments. It is important to understand these costs because 
they reveal how the fiscal risks associated with migration are allocated between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK. Scotland differs from other parts of the UK in its 
extensive tax and welfare powers. It therefore bears more of the fiscal risk 
associated with migrant flows than do other parts of the UK.  
 
Scotland acquired additional tax and welfare powers following the passing of the 
Scotland Act 2016. It already had wide spending responsibilities covering spending 
programs such as health, education and local government. The fiscal effects of net 
immigration to Scotland are shared between the two governments. Establishing the 
size and direction of these effects is complex. 
 
Take, for example, tax revenues. Migrant National Insurance (NI), both employer and 
employee contributions, is retained by the UK Government. Migrant income tax, on 
the other hand, forms part of the Scottish Government’s revenues. The major indirect 
tax, VAT, will soon be shared equally between the Scottish and UK Governments. 
Once the Scotland Act 2016 is fully implemented, the Scottish Government will raise 
around 40% of its total revenue. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows how employers’ and employees’ combined contributions to NI and 
income tax will vary with weekly earnings during tax year 2019-20. At the proposed 
Tier 2 earnings limit of £30,000 per annum, migrants to Scotland and their employers 
would be paying around £70 per week in income tax and £105 per week in NI. Thus, 
at this level of income, migrants would be contributing slightly more in direct taxes to 
the UK Government than to the Scottish Government. However, contributions to the 
Scottish Government exceed those to the UK once earnings rise above £1,050 per 
week (£54,800 per annum). 
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Figure 4.4 Direct Taxation: Revenue Contributions to UK and Scottish Governments 
 
 
 
Migration also has a more subtle effect on Scotland’s revenues. By contributing to an 
increase in population, migrants affect Scotland’s block grant allocation through the 
Barnett formula. This grant is adjusted upwards by Scotland’s share of the 
UK population multiplied by any increase in UK Government spending on 
“comparable” programmes, such as health and education. Positive net migration 
adds to Scotland’s share of the UK population and would increase its allocation from 
the UK Government so long as spending is increasing. A standstill in spending would 
mean that spending to cover public service use by migrants would be charged solely 
against Scottish Government tax revenues. We therefore suggest that analyses of 
the net fiscal effect of migration should take account of how migrants affect revenue 
raising and spending on public services at all affected levels of government.  
 
Summary and Implications 
 
An initial exploration of the fiscal impact of EU migrants in Scotland can only provide 
basic clues as to its direction. However, the evidence of differences between the 
volume and characteristics of migrants in Scotland compared to the rest of the UK 
are unlikely to substantially contradict the conclusions of the assessment of the fiscal 
impact for the UK carried out for the MAC. This would imply that EU migrants have a 
net positive fiscal impact on the Scottish economy. What has been established is 
that the volume of migrants in general, and EU migrants in particular, is relatively 
smaller in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. If, as the MAC study implies, migrants 
are making a positive contribution to the overall UK fiscal balance, increasing the 
volume of EU migrants to Scotland would boost tax revenues relative to public 
spending in both Scotland and the UK as a whole. Conversely, introducing the 
changes proposed in the White Paper would have a negative effect on this balance.  
£0
£50
£100
£150
£200
£250
£300
£0 £100 £200 £300 £400 £500 £600 £700 £800 £900 £1,000£1,100£1,200£1,300
To
ta
l N
at
io
na
l I
ns
ur
an
ce
 a
nd
 In
co
m
e 
Ta
x 
W
ee
kl
y 
R
ev
en
ue
 
Weekly Earnings 
Income Tax (Scottish Government) National Insurance (HMRC)
£30,000 per annum 
UK Immigration Policy After Leaving The EU: Impacts on Scotland’s Economy, Population and Society 
 53 
 
At the individual level, EU migrants earn less in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. 
This implies that tax revenues per head are likely to be lower. In turn, this implies 
that both the static and dynamic assessments of their individual fiscal contributions 
will be lower than for the UK as a whole. However, this effect may be somewhat 
offset by their younger age, which also has positive fiscal implications, at least in the 
static assessment, in relation to their lower demand for health and social care 
services compared with EU migrants in the rest of the UK. Finally, a rough 
assessment of the demands placed on educational services does not suggest 
substantive differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK. 
 
Thus we are left with the tentative conclusion that EU migrants to Scotland make a 
positive fiscal impact. This may be somewhat less than the MAC estimated 
contributions of £3740 per head for the EU-15, and £1040 per head for the EU-10, in 
2016-17, but is still likely to be significantly higher than the contribution made by the 
UK-born population, which the MAC estimates to be negative for the UK as a whole, 
at -£70 per head.24  
 
However, we also noted the importance of understanding the distribution of revenue 
and expenditure associated with migrants between Scotland and the rest of the UK. 
While Scotland is responsible for providing migrants with many public services, it 
may only appropriate a portion of revenue from migrants. This implies the need for a 
more nuanced analysis of the spatial distribution of the fiscal benefits of immigration.  
 
 
 
 
  
5
Demographic effects
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5. Demographic Effects 
 
 
This chapter investigates how the proposed changes to immigration will affect the 
Scottish population. We start by providing a brief overview of population trends in 
Scotland over the past decades, and then analyse different scenarios of how 
changes to migration will affect Scotland over the coming two decades. This 
Scotland-level analysis is complemented by an examination of the spatial distribution 
of migrants and the effects on population in local areas. We analyse the 
demographic effects of migration in urban, rural and remote areas across Scotland, 
and consider how the proposed changes might affect different types of communities. 
 
 
5.1 Population analysis 
 
Population change 
 
Over the last half-century Scotland’s population has increased from 5.20 million in 
1967 to 5.42 million in 2017 (Figure 5.1). However, the growth rate has varied 
significantly over these decades. While population growth was positive for short 
periods in the late 1960s and early 1970s and also during the early 1990s, 
Scotland’s population declined for most of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Figure 5.2). 
By 2000, Scotland’s population had declined to 5.07 million. This decline launched a 
debate in the re-established Scottish Parliament on the long-run sustainability of 
Scotland’s population. However, this trend began to change in the first decade of this 
century, and between 2000 and 2017 Scotland’s population witnessed a significant 
increase in its size of 7%. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Scotland’s population, 1967-2017 
 
 
Source: NRS 
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Figure 5.2. Annual population growth in Scotland, 1967-2017 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Migration has been the major driver of population change over the past four 
decades. Substantial out-migration from Scotland accounted for population decline in 
the 1970s and 1980s, whereas recent population growth is largely attributed to 
significant in-migration flows to Scotland. Natural change (birth minus deaths) has 
been marginally positive over the past forty years, although it was negative in the 
first years of this century and has become negative again in the last few years 
(Figure 5.3). The comparison of Scotland to the rest of the UK shows that recent 
trends in population growth have been similar in the four nations of the UK. However, 
unlike in the other nations, Scotland has experienced population growth only in the 
last two decades and the growth has been smaller than the average growth of the 
UK’s population (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3. Components of population change in Scotland, 1967-2017 
 
 
Source: ONS, NRS 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Annual population growth in Scotland and the UK, 1971-2017 
 
 
Source: ONS 
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Mortality and fertility 
 
Mortality has declined and life expectancy has increased in Scotland over the past 
fifty years. The life expectancy at birth was 70.65 in 1967, whereas the figure was 
79.03 in 2016, an increase of 8.4 years over a half-century (or 1.7 years per 
decade). There are significant differences in life expectancy between sexes; on 
average, women live four to six years longer than men (Figure 5.5). The comparison 
of Scotland with the UK shows that life expectancy in Scotland is shorter both for 
males and females; in 2016, the differences were 1.8 and 2.3 years, respectively. 
The cause-specific analysis shows that higher cardiovascular and cancer mortality in 
Scotland explains most of the differences in life expectancy between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Life expectancy at birth in Scotland, 1967-2017  
Source: Human mortality database 
 
 
Significant changes have also taken place in fertility levels. In 1967, at the heyday of 
the post-war baby boom, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 3.0 in Scotland. TFR 
measures the average number of children for a synthetic cohort of women in a 
particular year. Fertility declined significantly in the late 1960s and 1970s reaching 
the level of 1.7 in 1977 (Figure 5.6). Gradual decline continued during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, and by 2002 the TFR had fallen to as low as 1.47. 
The first decade of this century witnessed a significant increase in fertility levels; in 
2008, the TFR was 1.77. Thereafter, fertility declined again and the latest data 
(2017) report the figure of 1.47.  
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Figure 5.6. Total Fertility Rate in the UK by country, 1971-2017 
 
Source: ONS  
 
 
Again, fertility trends in Scotland have been similar to those in rUK in the past 
decades, except that fertility has remained at a lower level in Scotland compared to 
elsewhere in the UK. The average completed family size (or TCFR) has also 
declined over the past years, implying that the decline in the TFR is driven by 
reduced family size rather than the postponement of childbearing to later ages. While 
women born in 1951 had 2.03 children by age 44, those born in 1971 had 1.74 
children by age 44. The implication of this is that fertility levels in Scotland are too 
low to replace generations in the long run.  
 
International migration 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Scotland experienced a prolonged period of emigration in 
the last  three decades of the twentieth century, which was reversed from around 
2001 onwards. Net migration has been positive for both international and UK 
migration streams, averaging at a total of around 21,000 per year. Chapter 2 also 
showed that migrants to Scotland have a relatively young age profile. Migration 
between Scotland and overseas (including the EU) is dominated by those in their 
20s (Figure 5.7 and 5.8).  
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Figure 5.7. In-migration rate in Scotland from overseas by age (1-year groups), 
2001-2016 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Out-migration rate in Scotland to overseas by age (1-year groups), 2001-
2016 
Source: NRS 
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Population composition 
 
Past demographic processes have also shaped the structure of Scotland’s 
population. Those born in the 1960s form the largest cohort among the Scottish 
population, followed by their children or those who are currently in their mid-twenties 
(Figure 5.9). The number of individuals aged 65 to 69 is also large, indicating higher 
fertility levels shortly after World War II. The ‘waves’ in the age structure of 
Scotland’s population are not surprising; however, the baby boomers’ children cohort 
is smaller than their parents’ cohort and their children’s cohort is even smaller. This 
is most likely related to both the significant decline in fertility levels in the late 1960s 
and high emigration rates, which characterised Scotland in the last three decades of 
the twentieth century.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Scotland’s population by age and sex, 2016. 
 
Source: NRS 
 
 
The comparison of Scotland’s age structure to that of the UK shows that the share of 
baby boomers is larger in the Scottish population and the relative size of the 
youngest age groups is smaller than in the UK’s total population (Figure 5.10). 
Population ageing is thus going to be more pronounced in Scotland than in the UK 
as a whole.   
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Figure 5.10. Share of age groups from total population in Scotland and the UK, 2017 
 
Source: ONS, NRS  
 
 
Increased immigration and positive net migration over the past two decades have led 
to a significant increase in the share of the foreign-born population. In 2018, there 
were 460,000 non-UK born individuals in Scotland (with a confidence interval of 
±25,000); they formed 9% of the total population, compared to 14% of the population 
in the UK as a whole (Figure 5.11). Half of the foreign-born individuals in Scotland 
came from EU countries, whereas the share of EU-born individuals was two-fifths for 
the UK as a whole.  Scotland has fewer immigrants than the rest of the UK, 
especially England, but a larger share of them come from other EU countries.  
 
 
Figure 5.11. The Share of non-UK born population in Scotland and the UK, July 
2017-June 2018 
Source: ONS 
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5.2 Population projection 
 
Methods and assumptions 
 
In order to estimate the effects of the proposed policy changes on population trends, 
we conducted a population projection using the cohort component method as 
implemented in the Popgroup projection software (Edge Analytics 2018). We 
adopted the deterministic approach but conduct a series of projections to also deal 
with uncertainty (UNECE 2018). Our aim is not to predict the future, but rather to 
project changes in population size and structure conditional on different assumptions 
about future migration streams to Scotland. We used the 2016 ONS and NRS 
population projection as the baseline, which is the latest projection available. We 
prepared several projection variants, which are based on different assumptions of 
future migration to and from Scotland. We conducted a population projection until 
2041.  
 
The assumptions of the NRS 2016-based principal population projection are as 
follows:  
 
• Fertility rates (the TFR) are expected to gradually increase from 1.49 in 2016 to 
1.65 in 2041.  
• Mortality rates are projected to decline, although the decline will be slower than 
in the past; the life expectancy at birth will increase from 77.0 for males and 
81.1 for females in 2016 to 81.7 and 84.5 in 2041, respectively.  
• Migration from overseas to Scotland is assumed to slightly decline over the 
next few years – 30,000 individuals are expected to arrive in Scotland annually 
(from 2022 onwards); out-migration will be 23,000 individuals annually; 
overseas net migration is projected to be +7,000 individuals a year. Long-term 
migration between Scotland and overseas is calculated using a 25-year 
average of migration trends. Additionally, annual net migration between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK is projected to be between +7,400 and +8,000 
per year over the next 25 years.   
 
We use the same assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration in the rest of 
the UK as the ONS/NRS principal population projection for Scotland. However, we 
use different assumptions about migration to and from overseas, based on the 
analysis set out in Chapter 2. Our baseline projection assumes that overseas 
migration flows remain the same as they have been in the past five years (using the 
five-year averages for in- and out-migration), so similar to the average migration 
flows between 2001 and 2017. These estimates are much higher than in the NRS 
principal projection; however, they allow us to measure the effect of changing 
migration flows on population size and structure, as a result of expected policy 
changes.  
 
We will develop six variants (including the baseline): 
 
• Current migration: he annual number of migrants will be as follows: 34,500 
immigrants, 21,500 emigrants, implying overseas net migration at +13,000. 
(15,500 immigrants come from the EU countries annually and 7,500 leave for 
the EU with net migration of +8,000). 
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• 50% EU: Migration to and from the EU countries will decline by 50% after 2020. 
This corresponds to scenario 2 set out in Chapter 2. 
• 20% EU: Migration to and from the EU countries will decline by 80% after 2020. 
This corresponds to scenario 1 set out in Chapter 2. 
• 0% EU: There will be no migration from and to the EU after 2020. 
• 0% Overseas: There will be no overseas migration after 2020. 
• No migration: There will be no overseas migration and migration to and from 
the rest of the UK after 2020. This variant is developed to illustrate the effect of 
(mostly) past demographic changes, accumulated in the population’s age-sex 
structure, on the future development of Scotland’s population. 
 
Projection results 
 
Five variants out of the six show an increase in Scotland’s population (Figure 5.12). 
The size of the Scottish population is projected to increase 8% in the next 25 years 
for the current migration variant and 2% to 6% for the reduced migration scenarios. 
With no migration from overseas and the rest of the UK, Scotland’s population will 
decline.  
 
 
Figure 5.12. Projected Scotland’s population, 2016-2041 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
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ageing.  
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The dependency ratio (the ratio of individuals aged 0-15 and 65+ to that of 16-64) 
and the old age dependency ratio (the ratio of individuals aged 65+ to that of 16-64) 
provides another way of exploring population ageing (Figures 5.14 and 5.15). The 
share of people aged 65 and over is projected to increase from 29 per 100 to 
between 41 and 46 per 100 in the next two decades. The projection does not 
consider the planned change in pension age. Again, the variation is not large 
between the different variants, although the increase in the old age dependency ratio 
is largest for the zero migration scenario. 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Projected share of individuals 65 and older in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Projected dependency ratio in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
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Figure 5.15. Projected old age dependency ratio in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
 
 
Migration will have relatively little impact on the general trend of population ageing; 
however, it will significantly shape the size and the composition of the working age 
population (individuals currently aged 16-64). The analysis shows that with current 
migration levels the working age population would stay stable in the next 25 years 
(Figure 5.16). With reduced EU immigration it is projected to decline by between 
3% and 5%, with no overseas migration by 8%, and with no migration to Scotland by 
12%. The working age population is also expected to age, although the trends are 
more complex than anticipated. The analysis shows that the ratio of younger working 
age population (16-44) to older working population (45-64) would increase for all six 
variants, although the increase would be modest for the no migration variants 
(0% overseas and no migration in Figure 5.17). Interestingly, however, this ratio is 
projected to decline in the 2030s and the decline will be pronounced for the ‘no 
migration’ or the ‘UK migration only’ scenarios. This indicates the importance of 
overseas migration in shaping the composition of the working age population. 
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Figure 5.16. Projected relative change of individuals aged 16-64 in Scotland, 2016-
2041 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Projected ratio of population aged 16-44 to aged 45-64 in Scotland, 
2016-2041 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
 
 
We can also compare projected changes in Scotland’s population to those of the UK. 
We use the 2016 ONS principal projection and selected projection variants for 
Scotland. The ONS principal projection assumes that migration to the UK will decline 
by one-fourth post-2020. According to the principal variant, the UK’s population is 
projected to increase by more than one-tenth in the next two decades, whereas 
Scotland’s population will grow by 5% according to the ONS/NRS projections (with 
declining migration flows; Figure A7 in Annex A) and 8% if the current migration 
levels persist (Figure 5.18).  
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Figure 5.18. Projected relative population change in the UK and Scotland, 2016-
2041. 
 
Source: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population 
 
 
Interestingly, while the working age population is projected to decline in Scotland 
unless overseas migration stays at the current level, the number of individuals aged 
16-64 in the UK will increase slightly according to the ONS/NRS principal projection 
variant, which assumes declining migration trends. Moreover, the ratio of younger 
working age population (16-44) to older working population (45-64), which is higher 
in the UK than in Scotland, is projected to remain stable in the UK in the next 
decades, whereas this ratio is expected to decline in Scotland in the 2030s for 
reduced migration scenarios. Clearly, migration has been and will continue to be an 
important factor to ensure the stable size and age composition of Scotland’s working 
age population in the future. The share of people aged 65 and older is projected to 
increase in similar rates in the UK, Scotland and also in other European countries, 
although the figures will be slightly lower for the UK (Figure 5.19).  
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Figure 5.19. Percentage of individuals 65 and older in selected European countries, 
1950-2050 
 
Source: UN Population Division, 2008 
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5.3 Population and migration in local areas of Scotland 
 
Thus far, we have set out aggregate-level population projections for Scotland as a 
whole. However, current migration flows have a differential spatial impact. Moreover, 
as we saw in Chapter 3, the proposed new rules on immigration would have 
differentiated effects on migration to local areas. It is therefore important to consider 
how the changes would affect different types of areas in Scotland, especially those 
that are already in a relatively fragile situation in terms of their demographic and 
economic future. 
 
Although regional demographic trends do not feature among the objectives of UK 
migration policy, they are very important in relation to the Scottish Parliament’s 
devolved responsibilities for regional economic and social development. Indeed, in 
recent years Scottish economic policy has increasingly emphasised the twin goals of 
economic growth and reductions in inequality (both between individuals, and 
between places). This ethos is summed up by the term “inclusive growth”, and it 
forms one of the four key priorities of Scotland’s Economic Strategy.25 More 
specifically a concern to ensure that prosperity is shared by all parts of the country is 
reflected in the establishment of Regional Economic Partnerships,26 the local plan 
requirements of the most recent National Planning Guidance Framework,27 and the 
upcoming National Islands Plan.28 
 
Available evidence on the geography of migration in general, and EU migration in 
particular, is sparse, and requires careful interpretation. Almost all the data on which 
this section relies is available for Scotland’s 32 local authorities, but not at any finer 
geographical resolution which could facilitate an accurate analysis of urban-rural 
differences. However, broad contrasts can be explored on the basis of the recently 
published RESAS classification of Council Areas, which groups the Scottish council 
areas into the following four types: 
 
• Larger Cities 
• Urban with Substantial Rural 
• Mainly Rural 
• Islands and Remote Rural 
 
In addition, the mapping of selected variables at local authority level is helpful in 
highlighting geographic patterns which are to a degree independent of the broad 
categories of this council area classification.  
 
Key features of demographic change in different parts of Scotland 2007-17 
 
Over the past decade total population change is estimated to have been positive in 
three of the four categories of Council Areas. The exception is the islands and 
remote rural category, which have (overall) shown a decline of 1.3% in their total 
population. Taking the two components of population (natural change and migration) 
separately, it is clear that the two more urban groups of council area have a relatively 
positive situation and dynamic, benefitting from both positive natural change and 
positive migration.  
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The two rural categories show a more mixed situation. In the mainly rural areas, net 
migration over the 2007-17 period equates to more than 4% of the 2007 population, 
more than counterbalancing a small negative natural change. In the remote rural 
areas net migration of +1.5% (of the 2007 population) was insufficient to replace the 
-2.8% contraction of the population due to the surplus of deaths over births. 
 
 
Figure 5.20: Components of Population Change 2007-17 by Council Area Type 
 
Source: NRS Annual Population Estimates mid-2017 
 
 
However, this classification masks some important variation between individual 
areas (Figure 5.21). Edinburgh, East and West Lothian and Glasgow showed some 
of the largest proportions of change due to migration. Of the more rural areas, 
Orkney, Highland, Moray, Aberdeenshire, Perth and Kinross and Stirling also stand 
out. In all of these net migration accounts for more than 4% of the population change 
experienced between 2007 and 2017. Argyll and Bute, Shetland, Lanarkshire, 
Ayrshire and Dumfries and Galloway were at the opposite extreme. 
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Figure 5.21: Migration as a percentage of Estimated Total Population Change by 
Council Area, 2007-17  
 
Source: Annual Population Estimates mid-2017  
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Although the above analysis does not distinguish domestic migration from overseas, 
it serves to underline three key points about the importance of migration to 
population sustainability in Scotland: 
 
• Across the first three of the categories of Council Area migration has, over the 
last ten years, been by far the most important driver of population change, 
natural change being very much constrained (even here) by the ageing of the 
population. 
• In the Mainly Rural and Islands and Remote Rural Council Areas in-migration is 
the only option to sustain (or grow) the population in the short to medium term. 
The age structure of these areas is too “damaged” by past out-migration for 
natural change to play a role in recovery or repopulation. 
• With certain notable exceptions, migration seems to play a more significant role 
in local or regional demographic sustainability in rural areas in the north of 
Scotland than in the south of Scotland. 
 
Origins of migrants  
 
When the focus shifts to areas within Scotland, the two streams of migrants 
discussed in section 4.1 (overseas and rest of UK) are joined by a third component – 
migration between different areas of Scotland.  
 
Data exists for 2017 to allow us to begin to explore the relative importance of these 
three components of migration as part of current demographic processes across the 
Scottish council areas. Figure 5.22 shows the composition of in-migration assumed 
by NRS in their 2017 population estimates. Not unexpectedly, within-Scotland 
migration accounts for the largest share in all four categories of council area, ranging 
from a little less than half to three-quarters of all in-migration. The rest of the UK 
accounts for between 17% and 37% of in-migrants, the highest proportion being in 
the islands and remote council areas. The share of foreign migrants varies 
considerably between the four groups, rising to 28% in the large cities, and reaching 
only 7% to 8% in the more rural and remote areas. 
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Figure 5.22: Composition of Migrant flows by Council Area type, 2017 
  
  
Source: Annual Population Estimates mid-2017 
 
 
However, Figure 5.23 again suggests that the council area classification hides a 
significant North-South pattern. Of the more rural local authorities (where 
demographic sustainability is more finely balanced) Perth and Kinross and Stirling 
stand out, with more than 11% of their population change due to overseas migration. 
International migration was also relatively important in Shetland, Highland, 
Aberdeenshire and Angus. 
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Figure 5.23: In-Migration from Overseas as a percentage of total In-Migration 2017 
 
Source: Annual Population Estimates mid-2017 
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The significance of the geographic variation in the role of the three components of 
migration lies in their potential impact on the age structure of the recipient 
population. Overseas migration is particularly conducive to future demographic 
sustainability because, whereas a substantial proportion of domestic migration (both 
within Scotland and from rUK) is associated with retirement (or pre-retirement 
adjustments to working patterns), the majority of overseas migrants (68%) are within 
the younger part of the working age population (WAP), and therefore have a benign 
impact upon the age structure and fertility rates (Figure 5.24). 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Age structure of Migrants from Rest of UK and Overseas 2017 
  
Source: Annual Population Estimates mid-2017 (Table 8) 
 
 
5.4 Learning from the most recent (sub-national) projections 
 
The production of sub-national projections is a complex process, not least because 
of the need to ensure that flows between constituent areas, and projected population 
trends for those areas, are consistent with, and sum to, those of the country as a 
whole. As a consequence, the following account relies upon the latest principal 
projections made by NRS. These look ahead over the 25 years from 2016 to 2041. 
As explained above, these projections differ from the baseline projection produced 
for this report (section 4.1). Nevertheless, these NRS sub-national projections 
provide a good starting point for a discussion of the implications of the proposed 
migration policy after leaving the EU on geographic patterns of demographic 
sustainability. 
 
The NRS projections indicate that even with ongoing free movement of people the 
demographic situation of the Islands and Remote Rural areas will be a continuing 
cause for concern. Natural change over the 25-year period is predicted to equate to 
a more than 10% reduction in the population. Net migration is predicted to offset this 
by less than 3%. 
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Figure 5.25: Components of Population Change 2016-41 by Council Area Type 
 
Source: NRS 2016-based Projections 
 
 
By contrast, net migration into Mainly Rural areas is forecast to reach the equivalent 
of almost 10% of the current population, more than offsetting the natural decrease of 
a little over 5%. 
 
In the Urban with Substantial Rural areas, natural increase is predicted to shift into 
negative territory, but still to be more than offset by net migration, whilst in the Larger 
Cities both natural change and net migration are projected to remain positive, giving 
these areas the most optimistic future in terms of population growth, which 
approaches 10% over the next 25 years. 
 
Mapping the percentage of 2016-41 population change consequent on net migration, 
Figure 5.26 suggests that in addition to the expected areas of Glasgow, Edinburgh 
and the Lothians, the areas most affected by migration over the next 25 years are 
Perth and Kinross, Stirling, Moray, Aberdeenshire and Scottish Borders. The 
explanation of this change from the north-south contrast evident in the Annual 
Population Estimates is not immediately apparent. 
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Figure 5.26: Net Migration as a % of Total Population Change 2016-41 
 
Source: National Records Scotland 2016-based Projections 
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The above patterns of change assume only the continuation of existing trends, taking 
no account of the implications of UK immigration policy after leaving the EU. There 
are two arguments to suggest that the changes proposed by the White Paper would 
exacerbate the challenges facing the remote rural parts of northern Scotland: 
 
• The above projections suggest that these areas are already dependent on 
overseas migration as a ‘corrective’ for age structures which are incapable of 
generating positive natural change. 
• As Chapter 3 has shown, the replacement of free movement with an adjusted 
Tier 2 framework is highly likely to result in a substantial reduction of overseas 
migration to precisely these areas, because of their dependence upon 
economic activities (tourism, farming, food processing) which do not pay 
sufficiently high wages to meet the Tier 2 salary threshold. 
 
Summary and Implications 
 
Immigration to Scotland has been the major driver of population change since the 
early 2000s. Our analysis suggests that if migration stays at its current level (the 
average in- and out-migration flows over the past five years), the Scottish population 
is projected to increase by 8% over the next 25 years. With reduced international 
migration, population growth will be slower. Migration can also help reduce the 
speed of population ageing, although its impact is smaller than expected. The 
proposed increase in pension age may be a more important factor than migration in 
reducing the increase in the dependency ratio.  
 
While migration may not have a considerable effect on population ageing, it will 
significantly shape the size and composition of the working age population. In other 
words, migration will have an important impact on the absolute size of the working 
age population, as well as the age distribution within the working age population. 
Reduced international migration to Scotland would lead to a gradual decline and 
rapid ageing of the working age population. This is in contrast to the UK as a whole, 
whose population aged 16-64 would still grow in the scenario of reduced 
international migration.  
 
The ageing of the baby boom generation will drive population ageing in Scotland in 
the next two decades. Whether the working age population will also decline in 
absolute terms will depend to a large degree on the size of future migration to 
Scotland. With reduced migration from the EU, Scotland’s working age population is 
projected to shrink and become older because relatively small cohorts will enter the 
labour market over the next two decades. Overall, our projection results are very 
similar to those prepared by ONS and NRS, except that we project a larger growth of 
Scotland’s population over the next two decades (the ONS/NRS projections are 
presented at Figures A1 to A7 in Annex A). 
 
Importantly, the impact of these population trends would not be spread evenly across 
different areas of Scotland. Between 2007 and 2017, urban and mixed council areas 
have benefited from positive natural change (more births than deaths) and 
substantial in-migration (mostly from rUK but also from overseas). Mainly rural areas 
have seen a small natural increase, but this has been more than compensated by in-
migration. Remote rural and island areas, by contrast, have seen negative natural 
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change, which has not been compensated by in-migration. The demographic 
challenges for these areas will therefore be exacerbated by the proposed changes to 
EU immigration. 
 
This challenge is particularly acute given that for many remote rural and island 
areas, in-migration is the only means of sustaining the population in the short to 
medium term. The age structure has been too ‘damaged’ by past out-migration for 
natural change to contribute to repopulation. With some exceptions, migration plays 
a far more important role in demographic sustainability in rural areas north of 
Scotland than it does in the south of Scotland.  
 
Overseas migration is especially conducive to future demographic stability because 
of its relatively younger age structure. However, in rural and remote areas a much 
smaller share of in-migrants are from overseas than is the case in urban areas. Just 
8% of migrants to rural areas are from outside of the UK, compared to 28% for cities. 
Moreover, rural areas are far less likely to have jobs that meet the proposed Tier 2 
threshold. As a consequence, the changes proposed in the White Paper would 
largely eliminate opportunities for encouraging the longer-term stay and settlement of 
non-UK nationals in rural areas.  
 
For remoter rural areas and islands, attracting working-age migrants (including from 
overseas, and EU countries in particular) is the only realistic option to avert a 
downward demographic spiral driven by the age structure legacy of selective 
out-migration during the last decades of the twentieth century. These areas of 
Scotland seem to be facing a demographic ‘double whammy’ in leaving the EU and 
ending free movement which is likely to have far-reaching implications for economic 
activity, the provision of services, and levels of general well-being. 
 
 
6
Local Communities
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6. Local Communities 
 
This chapter examines in more detail the potential effects of the proposed policy 
changes on local communities in Scotland. In particular, it considers how the switch 
from free movement of EU nationals to the proposed immigration routes is likely to 
affect patterns of mobility, work and settlement in different areas. And, in turn, it 
considers how these patterns will affect host communities in terms of demographic 
sustainability, support for local services and social cohesion. 
 
It is important to note that UK immigration policy, and the White Paper proposals, are 
intended to manage immigration in a way that contributes to the UK industrial 
strategy. The proposed means of achieving this is through attracting migrants to 
higher-skilled and higher-earning jobs, while reducing lower-skilled immigration, at 
the same time bringing down overall levels of net migration. As such, UK immigration 
policy is not explicitly designed to address goals of population growth, offsetting 
population ageing, or sustaining local communities. Within Scotland, however, both 
national and local branches of government have made the link between migration 
and its demographic, social and cultural contributions. At national level this is clearly 
set out in the Scottish Government discussion paper Scotland’s Population Needs 
and Migration Policy.29 It is also a clear and consistent aspect of COSLA responses 
to MAC enquiries regarding migration needs and impacts.30 
 
The MAC report offered a rigorous analysis of the social impacts of EU immigration, 
including its effects on healthcare, social care, education and social housing, as well 
as impacts on crime and on well-being in local communities. The findings align with 
research on the impacts of immigration in Scotland.31 Our analysis in this chapter 
complements this work, focusing on the social effects of migration in local areas, in 
particular in terms of the impact on public services, and the well-being of migrants 
and local communities. 
 
Given the challenges in quantifying and measuring these types of impacts, we draw 
on qualitative data from a range of published studies carried out within Scotland and 
the UK over the last five to ten years, and from data available in the UK Data Service 
Reshare archive.32 The analysis also includes examples of the experiences of EU 
migrants and local communities, highlighted in text boxes. These often refer to 
individual migrants, but are included as they are indicative of broader patterns of 
experiences and decision-making of EU migrants. 
 
 
6.1 Patterns of mobility and settlement 
 
As we saw in Chapters 2 and 5, the period of free movement has seen a greater 
spread of migration across a wider variety of urban, rural and remote areas of 
Scotland. Whilst rural places still have much lower levels of in-migration, there have 
been higher proportions of inflows of EU migrants than non-EU, particularly into 
smaller urban centres within rural regions.  
 
Over the period since 2004 the composition of migratory flows and duration of stay 
have changed. Whilst initial forms of employment and periods of stay have often 
been temporary and planned as short-term, more recent studies have shown a 
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greater tendency for people to stay longer term.33 Also moving away from the initial 
profile of younger men travelling alone, women and families with children have 
become increasingly prominent amongst EU migrants.34 It is well-established in 
international migration studies that longer-term settlement most often arises in an 
incremental and initially unforeseen fashion. This has also applied to the situation of 
many EU migrants who have arrived to the UK during the period of free movement35, 
including those arriving to urban36 and more peripheral/rural regions37 of Scotland.  
 
Indeed, as the period of free movement has extended, migrant pathways to rural 
areas of Scotland have sometimes evolved from periods of employment in other 
areas (both urban and rural) of the UK.38 At the same time, the search for improved 
economic security and employment opportunities can also draw migrants away from 
such locations. More rural areas may offer less opportunities for occupational 
mobility, as well as fewer leisure or cultural facilities and less well-developed existing 
migrant communities.39 
 
 
 
A large qualitative study conducted in both rural and urban areas of Scotland in 
2014-15, as well as follow-up focus groups in 2018, found that few EU-8 or EU-2 
migrants had arrived in the UK with a clearly defined plan of where or for how long 
they would stay in the UK. Free movement had allowed many participants to ‘try out’ 
life in a number of locations both within the UK and in other EU countries before 
making more definite and longer-term plans. For a subset of participants, mobility 
within the UK had specifically facilitated relocation to, and then longer-term 
settlement in, Scotland. 
 
These participants spoke favourably about life in Scotland in comparison to 
elsewhere in the UK, perceiving a more reasonable standard of living and more 
positive social attitudes towards migration and migrants. Others commented on the 
beauty of the landscape, the opportunities for outdoor leisure activities such as 
hiking and camping, and a sense of general friendliness and welcome. These ‘softer' 
aspects, whilst perhaps secondary in initial migration decisions, became more 
important where longer-term decision-making was involved. 
 
‘I arrived two years [ago] and my first target was the UK, anywhere. But around 
London and the English part wasn’t so nice… And the people, the Scottish people 
are friendlier, I think. So when I was in Glasgow I got plenty of experience there. 
Here too…’ 
Andras, 44, Hungary, Highlands40 
 
 
 
Pathways of arrival and processes of longer-term settlement within the free 
movement framework have not been simply incidental, but have been promoted by 
active strategies of recruitment and retention. These have involved investments of 
financial, material and human resource by local authorities, third sector 
organisations, and employers. Recruitment was based initially on employers and 
employment agencies which sought to draw migrants to a range of semi-skilled and 
low-skilled jobs in agriculture, food processing, and transport services. First Bus 
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companies in Aberdeen city, Aberdeenshire and Angus, for example, ran active 
recruitment strategies in Poland and other EU-8 countries in the period following 
2004. More recently, recruitment has relied more heavily on informal processes of 
networked migration, but with employers actively involved and keen to see migrants 
with prior experience and skills development return.41 In many cases this has meant 
seasonal workers returning to the same farms year after year, a process which for 
some can eventually lead to more permanent forms of employment and longer-term 
settlement. The White Paper’s proposals for seasonal and temporary worker 
schemes are designed to limit such pathways to settlement, with the proposed 
‘cooling off’ period of the transitional temporary worker scheme specifically 
preventing year on year returns.  
 
 
 
A recent report from Scotland’s Rural College noted: ‘Returnee workers represent 
over half the Scottish seasonal migrant workforce, often leading to long term working 
relationships built on mutual trust and respect. Returnees reduce the recruitment and 
training costs for farmers and recruitment and familiarisation costs for workers. 
Additionally, it can help workers access opportunities for higher pay, overtime, and 
progression into supervisory /management roles. Long term returnees often become 
keystone workers, helping supervise staff and manage the business’.42 
 
This can be illustrated by the case of Paskal, a young man from Bulgaria who had 
been returning to the same farm in Aberdeenshire every year over the period 2011-
2015. In keeping with the findings of the SRUC study, he was motivated towards 
seasonal migration primarily by a higher earning potential than in his home country. 
However his decision to return annually to a particular farm was linked to working 
conditions and a positive relationship with his boss and co-workers. Unlike some, he 
had no plans to settle long term, preferring instead to build up sufficient savings to 
start his own agricultural business in Bulgaria.  
 
‘It’s a small farm, everyone knows everybody [else]. We’re close with our boss. It’s a 
very friendly environment here … so that’s the reason I come back to this farm.’ 
Paskal, 26, Bulgaria, Aberdeenshire43 
 
 
 
 
Effects on mobility and settlement patterns 
 
The White Paper’s proposals for a transitional scheme for short-term labour 
migration may temporarily alleviate some of the labour shortages created by the end 
of free movement. However, the restriction of stay to a maximum of 12 months 
followed by a 12-month ‘cooling off’ period will limit the possibilities for more flexible 
patterns of circular movement, and will require employers to hire and train up new 
workers annually instead of re-employing or extending the contracts of workers they 
have previously trained.44 This is likely to produce even greater problems for the 
social care sector, where in addition to the more formal aspects of training and skills 
development, workers need to build more personal relationships with clients over 
time to do their jobs well. The restriction on access to public funds will also limit the 
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possibility of migrants to sustain low-paid work through in-work tax credits. Although 
the specific bar on accompanying dependents within this scheme may make this less 
of an issue, the barrier to family migration may also make such employment 
opportunities less attractive to many, especially female, migrants.  
 
The varied pathways of arrival discussed above are also likely to be significantly 
curtailed by the current proposals for Tier 2. As we saw in Chapter 3, the vast 
majority of jobs available in rural and remote areas would not meet the proposed 
£30,000 threshold. Moreover, even where Tier 2 criteria are met, the restrictions on 
mobility under Tier 2 will limit opportunities for migrants to move between jobs or 
occupations, or to mobilise informal networks that facilitate further recruitment. In 
both cases then, many of the routes to more remote and rural areas, which often 
begin elsewhere within Scotland or the UK, will be cut off.  
 
Moreover, in limiting the possibilities for more flexible networked migration of family 
and friends, and putting specific restriction on family reunion routes, the new 
proposals may well discourage longer-term settlement for a subset of those 
EU nationals already living in these areas, even where they are eligible to apply for 
settled status. Existing studies have shown the value placed by EU migrants on their 
ability to bring over wider networks of family and friends and the ways in which such 
processes consolidate longer-term settlement plans.45 The presence of children in 
the country can be particularly important for decisions to settle but the presence of 
wider family networks can also be very significant. Concerns about elderly relatives 
who remain in the country of origin can play a role in deterring longer-term 
settlement or unsettling those who had previously planned to stay.46  
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Ewa moved from Poland to a small town in rural Scotland with her husband and 
three school-age children, motivated primarily by the wish to join her parents and 
siblings, who had left Poland a few years earlier: 
 
‘As far as [coming to] Scotland is concerned, my whole family lives here. They all 
came one after the other. I was the last to join. All my siblings... My parents... We 
were on our own there [in Poland] so we wanted to come here.’ 
Ewa, 37, Poland, Angus 
 
For others, new family formations had arisen as a direct result of migration. These 
new formations often involved the birth of children in Scotland and were frequently 
described as a significant factor behind longer-term settlement decisions. Gatis 
became part of an extended family of Latvian migrants when he met Madara and her 
older sister, Dita, in England. The three travelled to Scotland together and Madara 
and Gatis became a couple. At the time of interview, their child had recently started 
primary school, whilst the family’s increasing sense of security had led Madara’s 
older son and Dita’s two adult daughters and their grandchildren to join them in 
Scotland. As the three of them explained, the extended family was now well 
embedded in the village where they lived, the children were settled at school and 
Dita’s daughter was engaged to a local Scottish man. Although they remained 
concerned about their elderly parents still in Latvia, they stated that they were 
unlikely to leave Scotland: 
 
‘Of course, we can go back and find a job, but I don’t see any prospects for my 
grandchildren in Latvia. What will they do there? Here they go to a good school and I 
don’t have to pay a lot of money because they go to a state school. They go on 
school trips, and they’re treated well. The teachers are good and treat them very 
well.’ 
Dita, 45, single, 2 children, Latvia47 
 
 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the absence of pathways to longer-term stay will increase 
the demographic challenges for areas facing depopulation, and run counter to the 
specific investment by many Scottish local authorities in encouraging longer-term 
stays, with the aim of reducing depopulation in both rural and peri-urban locations. 
Such temporary programmes will also create other challenges for communities in 
terms of churn and lack of incentives or opportunities for successful integration 
(described in more detail in section 6.3).  
 
Local authorities have been aware that longer-term settlement is unlikely to take 
place successfully without systems of support in place. Whilst these have been 
incomplete and imperfect in most areas, nonetheless, community planning partners 
and non-governmental organisations, as well as local authorities themselves, have 
invested both financial and human resources in developing support systems and 
programmes.  
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6.2 Local services and infrastructure 
 
Impacts of EU migrants on public services 
 
Migrant workers have a significant impact on public services in many areas of 
Scotland. EU migrants provide labour in schools, health and social care settings, as 
both front-line and auxiliary staff. In so doing they contribute to maintaining 
communities and supporting the delivery of key public services. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, many of these jobs would not meet the Tier 2 wage threshold, or a lower 
variant of £25,000, and particularly with regard to women’s employment. The 
examples of teachers and social care workers are relevant. 
 
Local authorities employ significant numbers of teachers from both EU and third 
countries, especially at secondary levels. A stark fall in applications for teacher 
registration from EU nationals was reported by the General Teaching Council of 
Scotland in 2018, raising concerns about the impacts on schools, especially in the 
context of teacher shortages, particularly in more remote and rural areas.  Scottish 
Government and COSLA have previously presented evidence of the importance of 
recruitment of teachers from EU and third countries for Scottish schools. It has been 
noted that a number of local authorities (e.g. Highland) had experienced 
considerable barriers in their attempts to recruit teachers from third countries through 
Tier 2. Bureaucratic barriers and difficulties with applications for certificates of 
sponsorship were commonly cited.  Some of these challenges may be alleviated by 
a simplified sponsorship system as proposed in the White Paper, but plans for this 
have not yet been set out. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the social care sector is already facing acute shortages, 
and is reliant on non-EU workers to help fill gaps.  LFS data suggests that over 9% 
of the workforce in this sector were born outside the UK, with 38.5% of these coming 
from the EU. These levels are similar across urban and rural areas. Drawing on a 
survey of care providers, a Scottish Government report from 2018 found somewhat 
higher proportions of EU staff. The study showed that the proportion of EU staff was 
4.9% in remote rural Scotland, 5.6% in accessible rural Scotland, and 5.7% in the 
rest of Scotland. The study also found that EU workers were more prevalent in 
private sector services (6.4%), than in voluntary sector services (5.4%) and public 
sector services (3.7%). This breakdown shows a more nuanced picture than the 
headline figure in that study of 5.6% EU nationals employed within adult social care 
and childcare services in Scotland as a whole.  It highlights a convergence of areas 
with more acute recruitment issues such as nursing staff, particularly agency 
workers, and higher dependency on EU workers. It also shows that rural areas, 
where the overall rates of migration are lower, show similar levels of EU workers in 
this sector.  
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Managers interviewed as part of the study also highlighted the qualitative 
advantages that EU workers bring to the sector: ‘Some managers felt the 
contribution of their EU workers was greater than their basic numerical 
representation might suggest. Specifically, managers spoke of these employees’ 
strong “work ethic”, exemplified through a willingness to “go the extra mile” to get the 
job done and to continually learn and develop. Relatedly, managers sometimes said 
that EU workers appeared to be motivated by an “ethos” of care, manifest in a high 
level of commitment to their work. Less commonly, there was reference to non-UK 
EU workers being more highly qualified and/or experienced than local applicants. 
This perspective was advanced mainly by managers of childcare services, who 
described how their EU workers often had specialist degrees in childcare or in 
teaching’.  
 
The greater prevalence of EU workers in the private sector may also indicate 
potentially greater impact on that workforce as a result of the end of free movement. 
The bureaucratic barriers encountered by local authorities in recruiting teachers, 
noted above, are likely to be experienced all the more acutely by smaller private 
sector businesses, such as small family-run care homes which provide a greater 
proportion of social care in Scotland, primarily through contracts with local 
authorities, than is the case in England. 
 
The loss of this workforce would have a potentially negative impact for the resident 
population. A deterioration in key services such as schools, health or social care in 
areas with already declining populations could further undermine the capacity of 
those areas to retain their existing populations, including the locally born, thus 
potentially amplifying the demographic impacts of reduced immigration. 
 
Challenges of relying on low-paid EU workers 
 
While EU immigration to lower-skilled jobs has brought many benefits to local 
communities, there are also drawbacks to relying on migrant workers to fill less 
attractive jobs. As the MAC report argues, where jobs do not offer sufficiently high 
wages and acceptable working conditions to be attractive to the locally born 
population, they will also struggle over time to retain migrant workers. EU migrants 
working in agriculture, hospitality, social care and other lower paid sectors have often 
accepted considerable de-skilling and downward social mobility during the period of 
free movement.48 This has been a conscious trade-off made by EU nationals in 
return for the greater stability and security of the UK economy and welfare system 
than that available in many countries of origin, particularly in Eastern and some 
Southern European states.49 
 
Nonetheless, migrant workers in such jobs have expressed a strong desire for career 
development and have often suffered emotionally, socially and in terms of positive 
integration outcomes where they have been unable to progress to better paid and 
more skilled jobs over the longer term.50 They also consistently aspire to a different 
experience for their children.  
 
UK Immigration Policy After Leaving The EU: Impacts on Scotland’s Economy, Population and Society 
 87 
The Scottish Government’s draft budget 2018-19 includes a commitment to make 
Scotland an open and welcoming nation for people and their families to live, work 
and make a positive contribution to our country.51 It also aims to create a fairer 
Scotland, support inclusive growth, and promote community empowerment and the 
participation of people in all aspects of Scottish life.52 Neither of these goals is well 
served by an assumption that migrants will be content to do jobs which are 
unattractive to locally-born residents over the longer term.  
 
Local infrastructure and support for EU migrants 
 
There are clear links between employment in lower-paid and lower-skilled jobs 
(especially over the longer-term), difficulties in improving English language 
competencies, and needs for tailored or adapted support services for migrants.53 
In response to the employment of significant numbers of EU migrants within their 
areas, local authorities, community planning partners and non-governmental 
organisations have invested time, effort and money to develop a range of support 
services and initiatives. Cuts in funding have caused difficulty in the provision of 
support, and efforts are not always joined up or well aligned to migrant needs.54 
ESOL services are overstretched in many local authority areas and there are 
particular difficulties in reaching more temporary and seasonal migrants as well as 
those in rural and remote areas.55 
 
The proposed introduction of a new SAWS or a transitional temporary migration 
scheme as the principal route for lower-skilled and lower-paid workers is likely to 
have significant effects on their age profile, family status and length of stay. Younger 
workers, present in the country for a shorter time period and without dependents, 
may not need the same services which have been developed over the past 10-15 
years. Nonetheless, they are likely to have some support needs, at the very least in 
terms of dealing with administrative processes, and managing their day-to-day lives. 
Such support would either fall to employers to provide, in which case regulation 
would be required to ensure consistent and comprehensive provision across a wide 
range of employers; or it would require the development of new programmes and 
interventions by public and third sectors. 
 
In many areas third sector projects complement local authority led initiatives to 
translate information, provide interpreting and tailored support and advice, for 
example in relation to housing, community care and welfare rights. Such projects are 
often supported by the paid and unpaid labour of EU and non-EU nationals. Indeed, 
even statutory services are often facilitated by EU nationals in the employment of 
local authorities, schools or community planning partners who support the provision 
of important services as support workers, local authority officers, teachers and 
classroom assistants, and so on. As outlined in Chapter 3, there are likely to be 
significant difficulties in recruiting to such posts through Tier 2 if a salary threshold of 
£30,000 is maintained, and, for some jobs and areas, even where a lower threshold 
of £25,000 is applied. 
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In Perth and Kinross, the PKAVS minority communities hub, established in 2010, 
provides support services to people from minority backgrounds, particularly Eastern 
European, South Asian and Chinese. In 2013 the hub, then known as MEAD, dealt 
with 774 individual clients, over 70% of whom were EU nationals. Having identified 
language barriers as a key area where support is needed, and one which defines 
access to assistance in regard to almost all other support needs, the organisation 
has developed bespoke local interpreting and translation services, as well as 
language classes, referral and advocacy services, and rural outreach.  
 
The provision of education services has also had to adapt to the increasing number 
of languages (and associated cultures) within schools. In Glasgow, Shawlands 
Academy now has over 50 languages spoken by its pupils, whilst Annette Street 
Primary is nearly completely bilingual.  Clearly, this presents challenges in ensuring 
adequate support is provided for teachers and pupils alike. However, it should also 
be noted that the positive impact of exposing young children to a cross-section of 
cultures and languages cannot be under-estimated. Education inspectors have 
commended Glasgow’s approach to integration in education in the past. 
 
In Perth and Kinross, there has been an on-going year-on-year increase in the 
numbers of bilingual pupils in schools. Perth and Kinross Council currently employs, 
among the wider pool of Community Link Workers, two bilingual workers specifically 
supporting the Polish families in pursuing education. This is required due to 
communication issues and lack of integration of pupils and families with the wider 
community and the school environment. However, there are many positive aspects, 
including what is perceived to be a very positive educational ethos.56  
 
 
 
Support for EU and non-EU migrants 
 
The White Paper proposes treating EU migrants in the same way as non-EU  
nationals in future. This would apply both to Tier 2, which would be the principal 
route for EU nationals to access skilled employment, and to the proposed seasonal 
and temporary routes, with the former being open to all nationalities, and the latter 
(transitional) scheme to those from ‘low-risk’ countries. This change might imply a 
different balance of ethnic, linguistic and cultural needs within the new migration 
system. Whilst there is certainly nothing inherently problematic or wrong with this, 
existing services would need to adapt if these newer groups are to be well supported 
and this would require further financial and human resource investments, and would 
need to be carefully planned for.  
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A more narrowly defined and tightly controlled set of migrant routes into particular 
jobs and sectors could also undermine the ability of co-national, co-ethnic or 
language groups to provide support. If migrants arrive in smaller or much more 
diverse groupings, access to a critical mass of co-nationals with sufficient in-country 
experience to provide migrant-led support initiatives may be curtailed. This has 
already been the experience of some smaller groups of EU nationals (e.g. from the 
Czech Republic and Hungary) who have commented on their limited ability either to 
receive support in accessing statutory assistance, or to provide their own 
community-based support services by comparison to larger groups of Poles.57  
 
 
6.3 Integration and thriving communities  
 
Processes of integration among recent EU nationals 
 
Integration implies a process of adaptation of both host populations and more newly 
arrived individuals, over a period of time.58 Successful integration is typically 
associated with good educational and employment outcomes of first or second 
generation migrants, and positive social interaction between migrant and ‘host’ 
communities, the latter defined broadly to include both locally born, and other 
migrant groups.59 Successful integration requires the provision of services, 
guarantees and rights by governments and local authorities.60 
 
Experiences of EU migrants and host communities over the last 10-15 years bear 
out these assumptions, and show that – as with other, previous, instances of 
immigration – integration is often a difficult process. In some of Scotland’s larger 
cities, EU migrants have brought increased cultural diversity, including into 
neighbourhoods with high indicators of social deprivation. Indeed some housing 
associations have implemented specific policies of placing migrant families in ‘low 
demand’ housing as a part of local improvement and regeneration projects. There is 
some evidence that this increased diversity ‘has changed the “feel” of the area, 
softening a tendency for outsiders of any kind to feel vulnerable to attack or 
harassment and increasing the range of retail and leisure outlets, thus turning rather 
grim and forbidden streets into much more welcoming places’.61 However, migrants 
themselves have sometimes struggled, certainly in the initial period, with living in 
such contexts and have in some cases expressed fears about personal safety and 
about the risk of their children ‘over assimilating’ into negative local sub cultures and 
practices.62 
 
Especially in smaller, more peripheral areas with limited previous experience of 
migration in significant numbers, EU migrants have faced many of the same issues 
previously experienced by BAME communities and Commonwealth migrants.63 
These include issues with social isolation, pressure to assimilate to dominant cultural 
norms, difficulties with language learning, long working hours, living in concentrated 
groups within particular housing schemes and neighbourhoods, and concerns about 
longer-term prospects of full economic, cultural and political inclusion for themselves 
and their children. Nonetheless, many EU migrants also express a growing sense of 
‘home’ in Scotland and more specifically in the cities, towns and neighbourhoods 
where they live and work. 64  
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EU migrants living in rural regions of Scotland with previous experience of living and 
working elsewhere in the UK or Scotland have cited a more welcoming attitude in 
Scottish peripheral/rural contexts, as well as the absence of some of the challenges 
of living in urban neighbourhoods with high indicators of social deprivation as ‘pull 
factors’. This has been the case particularly for families with younger children.65 The 
development of Polish and East European shops, and other retail and consumer 
services (e.g. hairdressers, legal and advice services), even in relatively peripheral 
towns such as Peterhead or Arbroath, can add to this sense of ‘putting down roots’ 
and developing established communities.  
 
 
 
Kornelia and her family arrived in Glasgow in 2007 through personal networks and 
were still living in the same deprived area in 2015. She was interviewed in both 2010 
and 2015 and despite having some serious reservations about her neighbourhood 
expressed a strong and growing sense of being ‘at home’ in the area: 
 
‘I do [feel at home here] in a sense… I mean, I got used to living in this dirty area… 
When we come back from, say, shopping, and we come out of the tube, we say: 
Good old [neighbourhood]. If we say that, it must mean something... We know 
people by sight. Some older people address my husband saying: “Hiya, my friend.” 
People know us as well. We’ve blended with the environment. So in a way, I have 
got used to living here and it feels as if I’ve been here for a long time…’ 
Kornelia, 57 years old, Poland, Glasgow, interviewed 201066 
 
Elizabete had moved from Latvia to a small town in Angus in 2011, following her 
mother who was already settled there and bringing her teenage daughter with her. 
She talked about her close relationship with a Scottish neighbour and the friendly 
reception the family had received as key to a sense of being at home in Scotland. 
 
‘The neighbour’s spoiling us! Well, actually, she loves my daughter and she makes 
stuff for her, so if she catches me in the garden, she gives me stuff. It’s actually, 
what I find, it’s very very friendly, Scottish people around. It’s unbelievable, it’s very 
welcoming and… When we came just to visit mum for first days it’s people what we 
met in [small town], it’s just… Ooh! Really, and it was just first time and I thought 
then it can be place where we move ourselves.’ 
Elizabete, 39 years old, Latvia, Angus67 
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Initiatives supporting social integration in a range of cities, towns and smaller 
settlements seek to ensure that this process continues with positive outcomes for 
both migrants and longer-term residents.  COSLA have observed that ‘local 
authorities are at the forefront of integration and there is significant work being 
carried out by Scottish local authorities to make their areas attractive places to live 
and work.  There are many examples of local policies specifically tailored to attract 
and retain migrants.  For example, a focus on drawing skills and talent from abroad 
to support public and private sector skills shortages through, for instance, relocation 
and overseas recruitment packages; the provision of workplace ESOL to support the 
retention of migrants in local employment; and the provision of community based 
adult and family ESOL to enable inclusion and participation of migrants in their local 
communities.’68   
 
Impacts of short-term programmes on integration 
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, the removal of free movement and the introduction of 
more restricted routes under Tier 2 and seasonal/temporary schemes will have a 
significant effect on patterns of mobility and settlement. Migrant networks which have 
flourished in the context of free movement as a flexible and open migration system 
not only facilitate new arrivals but can also encourage and facilitate the longer-term 
settlement of migrants.69 Moreover, the relatively simple and adaptable ways in 
which this context has facilitated family reunion may also support better integration. 
International research has shown a positive correlation between more open and 
supportive family reunion policies (such as those in Sweden), and better integration 
outcomes.70 
 
The analysis of labour markets within the Scottish regions and particularly more rural 
areas presented in Chapter 3 suggests that in many areas, most or all jobs currently 
filled by EU migrants would not meet the Tier 2 salary threshold. This implies that the 
only viable migration routes into some communities will be under the proposed new 
seasonal agricultural workers and/or transitional temporary workers schemes. This is 
likely to severely disrupt opportunities for family reunion, and for longer-term 
processes of integration as outlined above.  
 
The constant churn which is integral to the seasonal and temporary schemes 
proposed will bring new challenges and tensions to community relations and to 
processes of integration, especially if it becomes a long-term feature of particular 
local communities. Previous experience of SAWS and other forms of temporary 
migration have seen larger groups of migrants often living ‘on site’ at farms with very 
little opportunity or motivation to learn about Scottish regulations, employment rights, 
culture or indeed language. Issues relating to work-based exploitation, health and 
safety concerns, as well as infringements of driving regulations have all been noted. 
Local authorities have needed to work hard to ensure migrant workers are safely 
housed, have the necessary knowledge of, for example, fire safety regulations and 
their rights as employees, as well as a sense of being welcomed in their 
communities. Where long-term residents have little contact with these workers, 
negative experiences and mutual misperceptions can flourish. 
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In Angus where there have been some of the highest numbers of seasonal workers 
in Scotland the local authority has organised regular roadshows to try to deal with 
some of the wide range of difficulties encountered by such workers. The equalities 
officer explained the various issues these events have sought to tackle and some of 
the difficulties in doing so: 
 
‘We have these roadshows … every summer. And it’s a partnership, so its ourselves 
from the council, it’s health, the Gangmasters Licencing Agency71 joined us last 
year… fire and police, English as an Additional Language… What we’re trying to do 
is just give people information about their rights and living conditions, what’s 
acceptable. The firemen will often give a demonstration of how to put out a fire. The 
police will talk about drink driving. 
 
‘We have the health people, they come along and have information on the safe limits 
of alcohol. They have information on smoking cessation ... But because we know 
they’re restricted in terms of what they can do, timewise, because they’re working so 
much on the farms, they’re trying to get a smoking cessation clinic to go round the 
farms. Because there’s not much sense measuring and going ‘oh yeah, you’ve got 
really high levels here’ and then not trying to do anything to help people. So that’s 
what they’re thinking about right now. 
 
‘In terms of physical activity… last year I think it was, the police organised for some 
Zumba classes to take place on the farms as well, to keep people motivated… 
 
‘We’ve had really positive feedback about the roadshows that we do, and we try to 
have them on the farms so people are not having to travel. One year we did try at 
libraries because we thought, well, free internet access, people might be coming to 
libraries, that didn’t really work very well because people were having to travel then 
to come to see us… nobody turned up’.72 
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Summary and Implications 
 
Free movement has facilitated flexible and open-ended migration routes, bringing 
EU migrants, and importantly, their families, to virtually all parts of Scotland. Such 
flexible pathways have been promoted through actives strategies of recruitment and 
retention. These have involved substantial investments of financial, material and 
human resource by employers, local authorities and third sector organisations. The 
White Paper’s proposals will curtail many of the pre-existing pathways, particularly to 
more rural areas, where many of the jobs which migrants have taken up will not meet 
the salary threshold, even if they are accommodated within a lowered skills 
threshold. 
 
The White Paper’s proposals for a transitional scheme for short-term labour 
migration may help to alleviate immediate labour shortages. However, the new 
restrictions on stay and return are likely to create considerable challenges for 
employers, particularly in key public services such as the care sector. They will also 
limit the possibilities for more flexible patterns of circular movement, and the 
potential for temporary labour migration to evolve into family settlement over the 
longer term. For those already settled in Scotland, the new restrictions on bringing 
over wider networks of family and friends may make permanent stays less attractive.  
Migrants have provided labour to key public services in many areas of Scotland, 
including schools, health and social care settings. Again, many of these jobs would 
not meet the proposed salary threshold, or even a lower variant of £25,000. The loss 
of this workforce, which in many cases may contribute to a deterioration of key 
services, is likely to have a negative impact for the resident population. This could 
further undermine the capacity of areas to retain their existing populations, 
potentially amplifying the demographic impacts of reduced immigration. 
 
At the same time, this chapter has suggested some drawbacks of relying on migrant 
workers to fill jobs which are unattractive to locally born workers due to low wages, 
low status, or poor career prospects. Such a reliance can have negative impacts on 
migrants’ social, economic and emotional well-being as well as lowering positive 
integration outcomes for wider communities. As such, it runs against Scottish 
Government commitments to equality, diversity and the creation of fair and 
welcoming communities. 
 
Integration, understood as a long-term process of adaptation of both host 
populations and more newly arrived individuals, is also likely to be challenged by the 
introduction of more restrictive policies and temporary schemes. If the proposed new 
seasonal agricultural workers and transitional temporary workers schemes are the 
only viable migration routes for some rural areas of Scotland, the changes are likely 
to produce constant churn in migrant populations. The proposed programmes are 
therefore likely to pose significant challenges for local communities, necessitating the 
adaption of support services, and disrupting longer-term processes of integration. 
Local authorities and employers are likely to struggle to meet these challenges. 
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A wide range of public and third sector support and advice services have been 
developed over the 10-15 years to assist EU migrants, especially those in lower-paid 
and lower-skilled jobs. These will require significant revision and new resources if 
they are successfully to support migrants coming from a more diverse range of 
linguistic and national backgrounds and under a new set of migration rules. 
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Annex A 
 
NRS 2016-based population projections  
 
 
This Annex provides the results of the NRS 2016-based projection and 
variants. Figures A1 to A7 are replications of Figures 5.12 to 5.18 using the 
results of the NRS projection. The assumptions of fertility and mortality trends 
and migration between Scotland and rUK are the same (or very similar) for 
the NRS and our projections. The main difference between the NRS principal 
and our principal projections is the assumption on future in- and out-migration 
levels. The NRS projection is based on long-term past migration trends (over 
25 years), whereas our projection uses average flows from the last five years 
(which are similar to flows between 2001 and 2017). Overall, the NRS and our 
projection results are similar, except that our projections lead to a larger 
growth of Scotland’s population. The comparison of the results of the NRS 
and our projections provides further information on how different assumptions 
about overseas migration between Scotland and overseas will shape 
Scotland’s population size and structure over the next two decades. 
 
 
Figure A1: Projected Scotland’s population, 2016-2041. 
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Figure A2: Projected share of individuals 65 and older in Scotland, 2016-
2041. 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Projected dependency ratio in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Projected old age dependency ratio in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
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Figure A5: Projected relative change of individuals aged 16-64 in Scotland, 
2016-2041. 
 
 
 
Figure A6: Projected ratio of population aged 16-44 to aged 45-64 in 
Scotland, 2016-2041. 
 
 
 
Figure A7: Projected relative population change in Scotland, 2016-2041. 
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Annex B 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
APS  Annual Population Survey 
ASHE  Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
BAME  Black and Minority Ethnic 
COSLA Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
EEA  European Economic Area 
ESOL  English as a Second or Other Language 
EU  European Union 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IPS  International Passenger Survey 
LFS  Labour Force Survey 
MAC  Migration Advisory Committee 
MEAD  Minority Ethnic Access Development 
NHS  National Health Service 
NI  National Insurance 
NINO  National Insurance Number 
NRS  National Records of Scotland 
ONS  Office of National Statistics 
OS  Ordnance Survey 
PhD  Doctor of Philosophy 
PKAVS Perth and Kinross Association of Voluntary Service 
RESAS Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services 
RQF  Regulated Qualifications Framework 
rUK  Rest of the UK 
SAWS Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme 
SOL  Shortage Occupation List 
SRUC  Scotland’s Rural College 
TCFR  Total Cohort Fertility Rate 
TFR  Total Fertility Rate 
UK  United Kingdom 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
VAT  Value-Added Tax 
WAP  Working Age Population 
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